Dissertation Defense: “Essays in Applied Microeconomics” Molly Schwarz

Date and Time
Location
North Hall 2111

Join us to hear Molly’s Dissertation Defense. She will be defending her dissertation titled, “Essays in Applied
Microeconomics” To access a copy of the dissertation, you must have an active UCSB NetID and password.

Abstract

This dissertation contains three chapters on applied microeconomics. Chapter 1 explores whether effective teachers
are more likely to progress to school leadership positions. Using data on 4th through 8th grade teachers at elementary and middle schools in North Carolina, I estimate the relationship between a teacher's effectiveness in teaching (as measured by value-added to math and reading standardized test scores) and their likelihood of becoming an assistant principal in the next academic year.  I find that one standard deviation higher value-added math (reading) teachers are on average 33.7% (7.9%) more likely to become an assistant principal in the next academic year after controlling for differences across educators, such as demographic characteristics, teaching experience, and training. There is important heterogeneity in the size of this effect across groups, with value-added being more predictive of promotion to assistant principal for both male teachers and non-white teachers. Finally, to explore the consequences of promoting teachers based on current performance, I estimate principal value-added and compare it to an educator's teacher value-added. Using a back of the envelope calculation, I find that these promotion practices on average lead to small positive impacts on student achievement.

Chapter 2 investigates the extent to which the provision of Medicaid to previously ineligible, low-income childless
adults affects their household composition. Using a staggered adoption difference-in-differences design on an urban
sample of individuals with less than a high school degree, we find that 26 to 39 year olds experience a significant 4.2% decline in the number of individuals living in the household, which is due to living with fewer extended family members. At the same time, 26 to 39 year olds experience a relatively smaller decline in the number of rooms (1.8%), leading to a 3.1% reduction in the level of household crowding, as measured by persons per bedroom. These reductions in household crowding are strongest for Hispanic individuals and those living in areas with above-median housing costs. In comparison, there are no significant impacts on household composition for 40 to 64 year olds as a consequence of the policy.

Chapter 3 is a laboratory experiment investigating the effect of payoff information on subjects' gameplay. We
experimentally study how mutual payoff information affects play in strategic settings. Subjects play the Prisoner's Dilemma or Stag Hunt game against randomly re-matched opponents under two information treatments. In our
partial-information treatment subjects are shown only their own payoffs, while in our full-information treatment they
are shown both their own and their opponent's payoffs. In both treatments, they receive feedback on their opponent's action after each round. We find that mutual payoff information initially facilitates reaching the Pareto-efficient outcome in both games. While play in the Prisoner's Dilemma converges toward the unique Nash equilibrium of the game under both information treatments, mutual payoff information has a substantial impact on the equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt throughout all rounds of the game. Using a belief-learning model and simulations of play, we provide evidence that these effects are driven not only by initial play but also by the way subjects learn. We propose that strategic uncertainty is a probable channel through which payoff information affects play.