Technology adoption under uncertainty: Take up and subsequent investment in Zambia*

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Abstract

Technology adoption often requires investments over time. As new information about the costs and benefits of investment is realized, agents may prefer to abandon a technology that appeared profitable at the time of take-up. This re-optimization can reduce the cost-effectiveness of adoption subsidies. We use a field experiment with two stages of randomization to generate exogenous variation in the payoffs associated with take-up and subsequent investment in a new technology: a tree species that provides private fertilizer benefits to adopting farmers. Our empirical results show high rates of abandoning the technology, even after paying a positive price to take it up. The experimental variation offers a novel source of identification for a structural model of intertemporal decision making under uncertainty. Estimation results indicate that the farmers experience idiosyncratic shocks to net payoffs after take-up, which increase take-up but lower average per farmer tree survival. We simulate counterfactual outcomes under different levels of uncertainty and observe that farmers with high returns are able to self-select at take-up only when the level of uncertainty is relatively low. Thus, uncertainty provides an additional explanation for why many subsidized technologies may not be utilized even when take-up is high.

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1 Introduction

Many technology adoption decisions—in development, health and environmental policy—consist of at least two parts, which occur at different points in time: an initial take-up decision and a subsequent investment or follow-through decision. While subsidies are often used to increase take-up, critics of subsidies for technology adoption worry that subsidizing the initial take-up decision may lower subsequent follow-through, leading to a misallocation of subsidized technologies to adopters who never use them.

The empirical evidence on whether the take-up price is correlated with follow-through is mixed: some studies find a positive correlation (e.g., Ashraf et al. 2010) and others none (e.g., Cohen and Dupas 2010).\(^1\) The literature has put forward many reasons why follow-through may or may not be affected by the initial cost of the technology, including screening effects, learning, and psychological channels such as sunk costs or procrastination (Ashraf et al. 2010; Cohen and Dupas 2010; Mahajan and Tarozzi 2011; Ashraf et al. 2013; Dupas 2014; Beaman et al. 2014; Fischer et al. 2014; Carter et al. 2014; Cohen et al. 2015). With the exception of learning, little attention has been paid to the role of dynamics and uncertainty in the initial take-up decision.\(^2\) Specifically, at the time of take-up, many of the benefits and costs associated with the follow-through decision may be unknown. New information may arrive after take-up in the form of learning about the technology (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and Udry 2010) or in the form of transient shocks to the opportunity cost of follow-through. If the new information is bad news about the profitability of the technology, then adopters may opt for abandoning the technology. Adopters know that they can reoptimize once new information is available and are likely to account for this at the time of take-up. Thus, the take-up decision can be interpreted as the purchase of an option to follow-through.

\(^1\) Similar issues arise in cost sharing of medical treatment (e.g., Goldman et al. (2007)).

\(^2\) The dynamic effects of subsidies on subsequent demand for the same technology is investigated by Carter et al. (2014), Dupas (2014) and Fischer et al. (2014), all of which find support for learning.
This paper identifies theoretically and empirically the role of uncertainty in the decision to take-up and follow-through with a new technology in a setting where take-up may be subsidized. We apply a dynamic conceptual model to farmer decisions to adopt a type of fertilizer tree in Zambia. This technology requires both a one-time take-up decision (purchasing seedlings) and a follow-through decision (planting and caring for the trees). Farmers face potential shocks to the opportunity cost of following-through with the trees, including illness of a household member, pests, drought or other factors that may affect (either positive or negative) other crops and/or the trees, and other events in the household or on the farm that may be hard to define or measure. Our approach to identifying uncertainty in our field setting circumvents the challenge of comprehensive measurement of all components of opportunity cost, including those that are not realized, by extending a revealed preference framework to the dynamic case: adoption-related choices by the same individual on the same technology are made at different points in time and reveal the information that was acquired in between. Our study proceeds in four steps: (1) a conceptual model of technology adoption under uncertainty; (2) a field experiment with variation in adoption payoffs at two points in time; (3) a structural model that builds on (1) and (2); and (4) counterfactual simulations that vary the magnitude of uncertainty and show implications for adoption outcomes.

To develop intuition, we begin with a stylized model of intertemporal adoption under uncertainty in the presence of subsidies, where individuals make binary take-up and follow-through decisions at two different points in time.\(^3\) Between these two points in time new information about the opportunity cost of follow-through is acquired. The theoretical model generates clear predictions about the relationship between uncertainty and adoption outcomes. First, a mean-preserving increase in uncertainty makes take-up more attractive provided that abandoning the technology at a later stage is costless. This is because, re-

\(^3\)Our empirical model adds an intensive margin to the follow-through decision, similar to Ashraf et al. 2010; Cohen and Dupas 2010; Fischer et al. 2014 and others.
Regardless of how costly following through turns out to be, profit is always bounded below at zero by the option to abandon the technology. Thus, uncertainty can only increase the upside of the take-up decision.\footnote{This is true even in the presence of insurance, as the costless exit is still present in this case and thus the contract becomes a substitute for insurance. See Giné and Yang (2009) for an example of how an uninsured credit contract may be more attractive than an insured one in the presence of limited liability.} Second, uncertainty undermines the screening effect of the take-up price. Intuitively, if adopters know little about their net cost of follow-through when they take-up, then a higher take-up price will not be effective at screening out those who will end up having a high cost at follow-through. Our conceptual framework borrows heavily from the literature on investment under uncertainty (Pindyck 1993; Dixit and Pindyck 1994) and, like Fafchamps (1993), shows that choices that appear to lead to losses (like purchasing a technology that is soon to be abandoned) can be rational ex-ante if their purpose is to preserve flexibility.\footnote{Other applications of dynamic decision making under uncertainty in the development and environmental literature include Bryan et al. (2014); Magnan et al. (2011); Arrow and Fisher (1974).}

Next, we use a multi-period field experiment in rural Zambia to generate empirical evidence for the presence of uncertainty. Farmers choose whether to adopt a tree species that generates private soil fertility benefits over the long term, but carries short-run costs.\footnote{Positive externalities, such as carbon sequestration and reduced soil erosion, further justify the subsidy from a policy perspective.} We observe whether the 1,314 farmers in the study take up a 50-tree seedling package at the start of the agricultural cycle. The follow-through decision consists of the number of seedlings that the farmer chooses to plant and care for (which we together refer to as tree cultivation) and occurs over the course of the subsequent year. Shocks to the opportunity cost of follow-through may cause farmers to abandon the technology, which they can do without penalty. We measure follow-through as tree survival after one year, and assume that farmers can guarantee tree survival for some level of costly effort.\footnote{The choice of minimum effort that guarantees survival is optimal under convexity of the survival risk function as a function of effort. The only source of uncertainty in tree survival in our model is the farmer’s endogenous choice of effort in response to new information about the costs of follow-through. This assumption is examined in greater detail in Appendix A.3.}
We introduce exogenous variation into this adoption decision at two different points in time. First, we vary the take-up cost through a subsidy on the purchase of a seedling package. Farmers’ response to this random variation helps characterize the heterogeneity in expected costs across farmers.\(^8\) Second, we vary the payoff to follow-through by varying the size of a reward that is conditional on the survival of at least 35 trees one year after take-up. The tree cultivation choices farmers make in response to the reward help us characterize the distribution of follow-through costs after potential shocks have been realized. Under the assumption that shocks are independent across farmers, the difference in the variance of net costs between the two points in time can be attributed to uncertainty.\(^9\) Note that, rather than artificially varying the allocation of shocks across our study population, the reward creates exogenous variation in the variance of possible outcomes faced by the farmers, and therefore in the distribution of shocks. By offering a positive payoff, the performance reward varies the distribution of shocks much in the way that varying the terms of an insurance contract has a state-contingent effect on the distribution of outcomes.\(^10\) Together, the different sources of variation at two points in time identify a structural model of intertemporal decisions that can distinguish between static and dynamic explanations for the outcomes that we observe. This is among the first papers to introduce multiple dimensions to the experimental design to distinguish between adoption decisions and returns to investment (see Karlan and Zinman (2009) and extensions of their design by Ashraf et al. (2010); Cohen and Dupas (2010) and others), and the first to use this research design to explore time-varying returns to investment.

The reduced form responses to the randomized treatments are broadly consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model in the presence of uncertainty: while farmers respond

\(^8\)Liquidity constraints could also affect the decision to take-up. To minimize the importance of cash-on-hand, farmers receive a show-up fee sufficient to cover take-up costs. We also test for self-selection based on broader forms of liquidity constraints: using random variation in the timing of the reward announcement. We discuss these tests for liquidity constraints and other confounds in Section 4 and Appendix A.4.

\(^9\)The cross-farmer independence assumption rules out common shocks. In a model variant, discussed in Section 5, we relax the independence assumption by allowing for an unexpected common shock to all farmers.

\(^10\)A similar approach is used by Einav et al. (2013); Bryan et al. (2014); Karlan et al. (2014), among others.
to economic incentives (they take-up at higher rates under higher subsidies and follow-
through at higher rates under higher rewards), the price at which each individual takes up
is not predictive of the follow-through outcome (i.e. we find no significant screening effect of
prices).\textsuperscript{11} In addition, a large share of farmers who paid a positive price end up abandoning
the technology altogether.\textsuperscript{12} Although these facts suggest that uncertainty plays a role in
farmers’ decisions, they do not allow us to quantify the amount of uncertainty farmers face
nor how important it is for farmers’ decisions versus other forms of heterogeneity that can
lead to similar behavior.

We turn next to our structural model to shed further light on the role and magnitude
of uncertainty in our setting, and the generalizability of our findings. We start by noting
that uncertainty is not the only plausible explanation for the absence of positive screening
effects of prices. When follow-through has an intensive margin, there may be heterogeneity
in both the level of the profit (for example, if there are fixed costs to adoption) and in the
number of trees that maximizes the profit (i.e. the interior solution to the farmers’ profit
maximization problem); moreover, these two types of heterogeneity may be positively or
negatively correlated. Only a positive correlation between the level of private profit and
privately optimal number of trees would generate higher follow-through rates among those
who participate at higher cost, yet a negative correlation is empirically plausible. Suri
(2011), for example, offers evidence of a negative correlation between optimal rates of usage
and fixed costs of adoption in the case of hybrid crop varieties. Our structural model allows

\textsuperscript{11} The lack of self-selection in our setting stands in contrast with Jack (2013), who provides evidence that
farmers self-select based on future costs into a tree planting incentive contract in Malawi. She studies a
different context and different contract design. In addition, the pattern of selection effects over time in her
study is consistent with a multi-year extension of our conceptual framework, which would predict stronger
selection as the number of farmers who continue to cultivate trees shrinks.

\textsuperscript{12} We rule out a number of alternative motives for this behavior. First, we rule out side-selling by exploiting
cross-group variation in incentives to side-sell. Second, we test whether a desire to please the experimenter
(social desirability bias) drives our results by allowing for a common “boost” to the attractiveness of take-up
in our structural model, and find it has little effect on our estimates (Section 6). We also examine the effect
of time inconsistent preferences (as in Mahajan and Tarozzi 2011) in Section 7 and Appendix table A.5.6.
for heterogeneity in the privately optimal number of trees as well as in the net cost of follow-through, and allows these two known (to the farmer) components of private profit to be freely correlated.\textsuperscript{13} We find that in our setting heterogeneity along the intensive margin of tree survival operates in opposite direction to the extensive margin heterogeneity (similar to Suri (2011)), thus weakening the screening effect of prices. In addition, our estimates find a large variance in the unknown component of costs; i.e. a large amount of uncertainty. To illustrate its magnitude, we calculate that 15 percent of farmers would change their ex ante decision about meeting the threshold if they could take the new information into consideration.

Given that both uncertainty and heterogeneity along the intensive margin are contributing to the lack of screening coming from the take-up price, we implement counterfactual simulations to better understand the relative importance of uncertainty in explaining our results. We find that at levels of uncertainty lower than those in our empirical setting, higher prices for take-up do have a positive effect on follow-through. Reducing the variance of shocks by 50 percent (everything else constant) would bring up follow-through rates among those who take-up under full price by 15 percent, because of improved screening at take-up.

Our conceptual framework and simulations also highlight the different role for subsidies in the presence of uncertainty. Greater uncertainty in the payoffs from follow-through makes subsidies less important for take-up because the option value, which increases with uncertainty, drives up the expected profit. However, with high uncertainty, the more modest effect that subsidies may have on take-up may be (almost) free of adverse selection effects, making subsidies less problematic for allocational efficiency.

Methodologically, our econometric framework is an example of sequential identification of subjective and objective opportunity cost components in a dynamic discrete choice model (Heckman and Navarro 2007, 2005). As described in Heckman and Navarro (2007), we can

\textsuperscript{13}This is akin to correlated random coefficient (CRC) models, where returns to the technology are allowed to differ across potential adopters and therefore influence their decision to adopt (Heckman et al. 2010).
account for selection into treatment (in our case, take-up) when identifying the distribution of
the unobserved opportunity cost determinants. We do so by introducing two layers of random
variation in economic incentives, one of which produces a probability of take-up equal to one
for a randomly selected sub-population and a second of which produces an interior solution
in tree cultivation outcomes with probability one in the limit. The use of experimental
variation in treatments at two different points in time offers an alternative to a panel data
structure (used for example, in Einav et al. (2013)), since statistically independent samples
are exposed to each of the different treatment combinations. To our knowledge, this is the
first paper to introduce experimental variation in order to satisfy the exclusion restrictions
needed for sequential identification.

The paper proceeds as follows. We begin with a simple theoretical model to generate
intuition. Section 3 describes the empirical context and experimental design, and Section 4
shows reduced form results. We present the empirical model and its identification in Section
5 and show estimation results and simulations in Section 6. Section 7 discusses interpretation
and Section 8 concludes.

2 A simple model of intertemporal technology adoption

Consider a two period model, where each agent chooses whether to purchase (take-up) a
single unit of a technology in the first period (time 0), and whether to follow-through with
implementation of the technology in the second period (time 1). The immediate cost of
taking up is $c - A$, where $c$ is the market price of the technology and $A$ is an exogenous
subsidy. The benefit of following-through is given by $R - (F_0 + F_1)$, where $F_0 + F_1$ is the
“net private cost” of following through and $R$ is an exogenous reward for doing so. Since
$F_0 + F_1$ is net of benefits, it can be positive or negative. The first component of the net
cost, $F_0$, is known to the agent at the time of take-up, while $F_1$ is unknown to the agent at
time 0 and its realization (which is revealed to the agent at time 1) has a known distribution that is constant across agents. Note that although \( F_0 \) is known at time 0, both \( F_0 \) and \( F_1 \) are incurred at time 1. Assume that \( c, A \) and \( R \) are constant across agents, while \( F_0 \) varies according to some cdf \( G_0(f_0) \). Assume further that

(i) \( F_0 \) and \( F_1 \) are independent, and

(ii) \( E_{t=0}(F_1) = E_{t=1}(F_1) = 0 \) (i.e. agents have rational expectations).

Under these assumptions, \( F_0 \) represents the agent’s best guess at \( t = 0 \) about her specific net cost of following through, and \( F_1 \) represents any new information that emerges after the take-up decision is made.

Following backward induction, the agent decides to follow-through at \( t = 1 \) if \( R - F_0 - F_1 > 0 \). If this inequality does not hold, the agent receives a payoff of zero at \( t = 1 \). At \( t = 0 \), the agent decides to take-up by purchasing the technology if

\[
c - A - \delta E_{F_1} \max(R - F_0 - F_1, 0) < 0
\]

where \( \delta \) is the one-period discount factor and the expectation in (1) is taken with respect to the density of \( F_1 \).

To simplify the exposition, assume that the distribution of \( F_1 \) is such that \( F_1 \in \{f_L, f_H\} \), with \( f_L < f_H \) and \( \Pr(F_1 = f_L) = p_L \). Thus we can represent a mean-preserving increase in uncertainty as a symmetric widening of the distance between \( f_L \) and \( f_H \).\(^{14}\) With this assumption, we can classify individuals into three types: those who always follow through, regardless of the realization of \( F_1 \) (always follow-through types), those who follow through only if the low net cost shock is realized (contingent follow-through types), and those who

\(^{14}\)This model simplifies our empirical setting in two key ways: first, it assumes a binary follow-through decision and second, it assumes a discrete distribution on \( F_1 \). As we show when we present our empirical model, the propositions derived from this model are not an artifact of the distributional assumption on \( F_1 \) nor of the binary decision that characterizes follow-through in this simple model.
never follow-through (never follow-through types). These three types of agents can be characterized by whether their value of $F_0$ is below $R - f_H$, between $R - f_H$ and $R - f_L$, and above $R - f_L$, respectively. Figure 1 graphically shows the proportions for each type of agent using areas under a symbolic bell-shaped distribution for $F_0$, separated by gray dashed lines. Figure 1 also illustrates two thresholds (along the support of $F_0$) for take-up in black dashed lines. The first take-up threshold (labeled $R - \mathbb{E}(F_1) - \frac{(c-A)}{\delta}$) is only binding if it falls to the left of the threshold that defines always adopters ($R - f_H$). When this first take-up threshold binds, only always follow-through types take-up. The second take-up threshold (labeled $R - f_L - \frac{(c-A)}{\delta p_L}$) is perhaps more interesting. When binding, all always-follow through types take-up, but only a share of contingent follow-through types take-up (those to the left of the threshold). We use this figure to explain intuitively the results outlined by each of our propositions below. The formal proofs of these propositions can be found in Appendix A.1.

Figure 1: Take-up and follow-through thresholds as a function of agent type

Notes: The figure shows the shares of always adopters, contingent adopters and non-adopters over a symbolic probability density function of $F_0$. The grey thresholds ($R - f_H$ and $R - f_L$) correspond to the follow-through thresholds, while the black thresholds correspond to the take-up thresholds.
Proposition 1  *Follow-through conditional on take-up increases as a function of take-up cost, i.e. there is a screening effect of the take-up cost.*

To see this, note that as take-up cost increases (represented by $c - A$ in Figure 1), the second take-up threshold moves to the left, bringing down the overall share of contingent follow-through types among the set of individuals who take-up. Since contingent adopters follow-through with probability less than one ($p_L$), this in turn increases the share of individuals who follow-through among those who take-up.\(^{15}\)

Proposition 2  *An increase in uncertainty reduces follow-through conditional on take-up.*

This can also be appreciated from Figure 1: a widening of the distance between $f_L$ and $f_H$ causes the share of contingent follow-through types to increase (as the two grey dashed lines move further apart). Note that as uncertainty increases, the position of the second take-up threshold does not change relative to the threshold that determines the upper bound for contingent follow-through types. Thus, this group becomes a larger share of those who take up, reducing average follow-through.

Corollary 2.1  *Under no uncertainty, everyone who takes-up follows-through.*

This is easy to see from Figure 1: under no uncertainty (where $f_L = f_H$) there would be only always follow-through types and never follow-through types.

Proposition 3  *An increase in uncertainty weakens the relationship between take-up cost and conditional follow-through shown in Proposition 1.*

To see this, consider the takeaways of Propositions 1 and 2 simultaneously. The share of contingent adopters that are excluded by an increase in the take-up cost becomes a smaller

\(^{15}\)If the take-up cost, $c - A$, increases enough that the first take-up threshold is binding, follow-through conditional on take-up reaches 100 percent and is constant for further increases in the take-up cost.
proportion of all those who take-up when uncertainty increases.

**Proposition 4** The option value associated with take-up is increasing in uncertainty, which results in higher take-up at all take-up cost levels.

This is shown formally in the appendix along with the formal definition of option value in our context. Intuitively, the option value is the value of reoptimizing once new information (the realization of $F_1$) emerges. As the distance between $f_H$ and $f_L$ increases, the payoff at $t = 1$ conditional on a low cost shock ($f_L$) increases for contingent follow-through types. Because agents can choose not to follow through, the payoff at $t = 1$ conditional on a high cost ($f_H$) stays constant at zero. Thus, the expected value of the contract at $t = 0$ increases with uncertainty, and this increase emerges solely because of the possibility of reoptimizing (i.e. choosing not to follow-through). This results in higher take-up.

**A note on risk neutrality.** We assume linear utility – or risk neutrality – throughout the paper, including the empirical analysis. Assuming some degree of risk aversion would not change our results qualitatively, although it would lower the value placed on extreme positive profitability shocks at the time of take-up. This would make the expected value of the contract at $t = 0$, and therefore take-up, less responsive to increases in uncertainty. That said, the risk neutrality assumption is relatively innocuous and carries important advantages given our empirical context. Although risk aversion is an important component of intertemporal decisions with costs or benefits that represent substantial shares of household income, our specific technology adoption decision causes relatively small changes to income. In addition, our framework (both theoretical and empirical) models decisions as a function of the profits associated with adoption relative to the best alternative use of household resources. Thus, a positive shock to the opportunity cost of adoption could correspond to an increase or a decrease in overall household income. For example, an increase in prof-
itability of a competing economic activity and a labor shortage due to health could both represent an increase in the opportunity cost of adoption, but would have opposite effects on total income and thus on marginal utility of income. Incorporating risk aversion into our theoretical model would require us to make modeling assumptions about the nature of the opportunity cost of adoption. Hence, assuming risk neutrality allows us to leave the source of the opportunity cost unspecified, which makes our framework generalizable to any source of uncertainty regardless of its impact on overall income.

**Transitory shocks and learning.** So far, we have left open the question of whether $F_1$ should be interpreted as a persistent or a transitory shock and our framework is consistent with both interpretations. However, the distinction matters for future take-up decisions. If the $F_1$ component of the returns to the technology is persistent, future take-up decisions will occur under a lower level of uncertainty. If $F_1$ is transitory, future take-up decisions will look similar to the first take-up decision. We cannot completely disentangle these two interpretations of the model in our context, though we use survey data to provide suggestive evidence on the extent of learning (see Section 7).

### 3 Context and experimental design

We bring the propositions from our conceptual model to a two-part technology adoption problem, characterized by uncertainty in the costs and benefits of following through with the technology. In the context of an ongoing project to encourage the adoption of agroforestry trees (*Faidherbia albida*), we introduce exogenous variation in the payoffs to farmers at the time of their take-up and follow-through decisions. We use the experimental variation to uncover the existing levels of static heterogeneity and uncertainty in the population of farmers, which we model as random parameters. This section describes the context and the
experimental design in detail.

The study was implemented in coordination with Dunavant Cotton Ltd., a large cotton growing company with over 60,000 outgrower farmers in Zambia, and with an NGO, Shared Value Africa. The project, based in Chipata, Zambia, targeted approximately 1,300 farmers growing cotton under contract with Dunavant, alongside other subsistence crops. The project is part of the NGO partner's portfolio of carbon market development projects in Zambia.

3.1 The technology

*Faidherbia albida* is an agroforestry species endemic to Zambia that fixes nitrogen, a limiting nutrient in agricultural production, in its roots and leaves. Optimal spacing of *Faidherbia* is around 100 trees per hectare, or at intervals of 10 meters. The relatively wide spacing, together with the fact that the tree sheds its leaves at the onset of the cropping season, means that planting *Faidherbia* does not displace other crop production (Akinnifesi et al. 2010). Agronomic studies suggest significant yield gains from *Faidherbia*.\(^{16}\) However, these private benefits take 7-10 years to reach their full value, and may be insufficient to justify the up-front investment costs, particularly if farmers have high discount rates. We observe low adoption rates at baseline: less than 10 percent of the study households reported any *Faidherbia* on their land. This could be explained by low perceived private net-benefits, by high costs associated with accessing inputs – there is no existing market for *Faidherbia* seedlings – or cultivating the trees, or by a lack of information.\(^ {17}\)

Subsidies may therefore be necessary to increase take-up rates, and are justified by positive environmental externalities and market failures that contribute to high private discount

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\(^{16}\) Estimates of yield increases range from 100 to 400 percent, relative to production without fertilizer (Saka et al. 1994; Barnes and Fagg 2003). The benefits relative to optimal fertilizer application are less well understood, but 30 percent of farmers in our baseline survey do not use any fertilizer and those who do use it primarily for cash crops.

\(^ {17}\) Informal land tenure presents an additional barrier to adoption. By focusing on landholders engaged in contract farming arrangements, the project targets households with relatively secure tenure.
rates. Environmental benefits include erosion control, wind breaks, and carbon sequestration. Based on allometric equations from Brown (1997), adapted to the growth curves for *Faidherbia*, we estimate that over 30 years, a tree sequesters around 4 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. Discounting the annual sequestration at 15 percent leads to a present value of around 0.48 tons per tree.

Both the private and the public benefits associated with adoption require that farmers continue to invest in the technology after the initial take-up decision. To keep trees alive, farmers must plant, water, weed and otherwise care for the trees, activities that are costly in the short run. In addition, the opportunity cost of these investments may depend on shocks to household labor supply, weather, pests and prices, all of which are realized after take-up. Therefore, the technology maps clearly onto our conceptual framework.

### 3.2 Experimental design and data collection

The field experiment was implemented between November 2011 and December 2012 with 125 farmer groups and 1,314 farmers. Implementation of the study relied on Dunavant’s outgrower infrastructure, which is organized around sheds, each of which serves several dozen farmer groups. Each farmer group consists of 10-15 farmers and a lead farmer, who is trained by Dunavant each year and in turn trains his or her own farmers on a variety of agricultural practices. Implementation was concentrated at two points in the agricultural season, as shown in Appendix figure A.5.1. First, farmer training, program enrollment, and a baseline survey all occurred at the beginning of the planting season. As the figure shows, this is also the time that farmers make decisions on other crops and technologies. Second, the endline survey, tree survival monitoring and reward payment occurred at the end of our study period, one year after program enrollment. In addition to these main stages, we performed mid-year tree monitoring for a subsample of our farmers and a brief survey at the end of the planting
season.

At the training, farmers were provided with instructions on planting and caring for the trees, information about the private fertilizer benefits and public environmental benefits of the trees, and details on eligibility for the program. All farmers who attended the training received a show up fee of 12,000 ZMK and lunch. Farmers were told the money received, which was equivalent to about a day’s agricultural wages, was compensation for their time and was theirs to keep. This design feature was intended to reduce the effect of immediate liquidity constraints on take-up.

Enrollment occurred at the end of the training and consisted of farmers’ take-up decision. Study enumerators explained the details of the enrollment choice: a take it or leave it offer of a fixed number of seedlings (50, or enough to cover half a hectare) to be planted and managed by the farmer and his or her household. The study design varied two major margins of the farmer’s decision to adopt *Faidherbia albida*. First, the size of the take-up subsidy ($A$) varied between 0, 4,000, 8,000, and 12,000 ZMK. At zero subsidy, farmers paid 12,000 ZMK (approximately USD 2.60) for inputs, which is the cost recovery price for the implementing organization, but is likely to fall below farmers’ full cost of accessing seeds or seedlings outside of the program. Groups were randomly assigned to one of four take-up subsidy treatments with equal probability using the min max T approach (Bruhn and McKenzie 2009), balanced on Dunavant shed, farmer group size and day of the training. The subsidized price of the inputs was announced to all farmers in the group at the end of training, before the take-up decision was made.

Second, the program offered a threshold payment conditional on follow-through (tree survival) after one year. The payment varied randomly across farmers. Farmers received the reward if they kept 70 percent (35) of the trees alive through the first dry season (for 1

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18 Eligibility required that land must have been un-forested for 20 years, must be owned by the farmer, and must not be under flood irrigation.
The threshold reward, as opposed to a per-tree incentive, allows us to draw a sharper distinction between internal incentives and external incentives to cultivate the trees, which aids identification of the structural model. To implement the individual-level randomization of the rewards and allow participants to make their take-up decision in private, the study enumerators called the farmers aside one by one and described the threshold nature of the reward. The farmer then drew a scratch off card from a bucket, which revealed the individual reward value, after which the take-up decision was recorded. The size of the threshold performance reward \( R \) was varied in increments of 1,000 ZMK, ranging from zero to 150,000 ZMK or approximately 30 USD.\(^{19}\) Variation in the reward was introduced using a random draw at the time of the take-up decision. One-fifth of all draws were for zero ZMK with the remaining four-fifths distributed uniformly over the range. The frequency of treatment outcomes are shown in Appendix figure A.5.2.

We introduced an additional source of variation that allowed us to test for liquidity constraints as a driver of selection outcomes: the timing of the reward draw was varied at the individual level to occur either before or after the farmer’s take-up decision, with 52.5% assigned to the surprise reward treatment. When the reward is known before take-up, it affects both the type of farmer who takes-up and also the decision to follow-through; when it is not known at take-up, it affects only follow-through. Varying when the reward was revealed allows us to isolate its effect on selection, in a similar spirit to Karlan and Zinman (2009).\(^{20}\)

Following the take-up decision, all farmers were given a baseline survey that lasted for approximately one hour. After the survey, participating farmers signed a contract indicating

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\(^{19}\)At the time of the study, the exchange rate was just under 5000 ZMK = 1 USD. In piloting, the distribution of payments extended to 200,000 but was scaled back prior to implementation. The scratch cards with values between 150,000 and 200,000 were removed from the prepared cards by hand, but six of them were missed. For the main analysis, we top-code payments at 150,000.

\(^{20}\)We do not manipulate or measure beliefs about potential financial benefits from joining in the surprise reward treatment, and cannot therefore assume that farmers in the surprise reward treatment assumed \( R = 0 \) at the time of take-up.
their agreement with the program terms, paid the take-up cost and collected their seedlings. To minimize the effect of seedling quality on tree survival, farmers were not allowed to pick their seedlings.

One year after the training, all farmers in the study sample were given an endline survey. Approximately one week after the endline survey, farmers with contracts were visited for field monitoring, during which the farmer and a study enumerator examined each tree, and recorded whether it was sick, healthy or dead. Monitors also recorded indicators of activities likely to affect survival outcomes: weeding, watering, constructing fire breaks, and field burning (which, in contrast to the other three, threatens tree survival). All surviving trees counted toward the tree survival threshold. Within a couple of days of the monitoring visit, farmers with 35 or more surviving trees received their reward payment. Keeping the payments separate from the monitoring was intended to improve monitors’ objectivity.\(^{21}\)

In addition to the baseline and endline surveys, one-fifth of the farmers were randomly sampled for ongoing data collection on activities and inputs associated with the trees and with other crops. Farmers selected for this effort monitoring received a very short survey (around 20 minutes) every two weeks, during which a project monitor asked the farmer about agricultural activities, including those related to the trees, since the last visit. No information was provided to the farmers about their performance and monitors were instructed not to prompt specific activities or answer technical questions. We control for the effort monitoring subsample in our analysis. The resulting data yield two important facts about the timing of farmer investments. First, planting activities began immediately after the training for some farmers, while other farmers chose to delay tree planting until other crops were planted and the rainfall patterns were clearly established. Second, tree care activities spanned the

\(^{21}\) As a check for collusion between the monitors and farmers, we test whether individual monitors are associated with a higher probability that a farmer passes the tree survival threshold. No single monitor indicator is significantly correlated with reaching the threshold, nor are the monitor indicators jointly predictive. Given differences in career concerns across monitors (some had higher paid jobs as survey supervisors when not engaged in monitoring), similar levels of cheating by all monitors is unlikely.
entire agricultural season and tapered off before the tree survival monitoring one year after training, consistent with the need for ongoing investments on the part of the farmer.

**A note on the timing of farmers’ decisions and information.** Because the program offered rewards and measured outcomes for one year, farmers’ take-up and follow-through decisions are based on their perceptions about costs and benefits during the first year only. The rationale for the reward design is that the costs associated with planting and caring for the trees are highest during the first year when the trees are vulnerable and require attention in the form of watering, weeding and protection from pests. After they survive the first dry season, costs decrease substantially. The follow-through decision we observe is more accurately described as the cumulative outcome from numerous follow-through decisions made over the course of the year after take-up. New information may reveal itself starting immediately after the take-up decision is made, or at different points in time, as family members fall ill, crops fail, or input and output prices change. When new information arrives that affects the opportunity cost of caring for the trees, farmers may reoptimize on the number of trees they continue to cultivate (if any). Note that our empirical model imposes a simplified version of the timing, where we assume there are only two decision periods (take-up and follow-through) as opposed to many. This simplified timing assumption corresponds well to the empirical setting if the bulk of the information arrives shortly after take-up or with a series of shocks that are highly correlated. On the benefit side, we expect to see little change in information within the first year since the private benefits take considerably longer than the costs to materialize. Of course, farmers may still face uncertainty about the costs and benefits of keeping trees alive, even after follow-through is measured.

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22 The take-up decision is made at the beginning of the planting season, as shown in Appendix figure A.5.1. This is the natural timing of take-up decisions for other crops and technologies. Therefore, our design allows for an amount of time between take-up and follow-through that is similar to many other agricultural technologies.
4 Summary statistics and reduced form results

Appendix table A.5.1 shows baseline summary statistics by treatment and treatment balance. Around 70 percent of participants are heads of household and 13 percent of households are female-headed. Respondents have, on average, just over 5 years of education and live in households with just over 5 members. Households have around 3 hectares of land spread across just under 3 fields, which are an average of around 20 minutes away from their dwelling. Around 10 percent of households state that soil fertility is one of the major challenges that their household faces. Households have worked with Dunavant Cotton for an average of over 4 years and over 40 percent interact regularly with their lead farmer. Almost 70 percent of respondents report familiarity with the technology but only around 10 percent had adopted prior to the program, likely due in part to the absence of a market for Faidherbia albida seeds or seedlings.

We test for balance in the randomization outcomes by correlating observable characteristics with treatment levels and assignment. Appendix table A.5.1 tests balance for the take-up subsidy, threshold performance reward, and surprise reward treatment. Larger households with more non-agricultural assets are more likely to receive lower take-up subsidies on average. Older respondents with larger households and better self-reported soil fertility are marginally more likely to be assigned to the surprise reward treatment. The table consists of 51 separate regressions. Five significant coefficients is therefore consistent with significance threshold of 10 percent.

We also examine whether non-random attrition at any stage of data collection affects internal validity (Appendix table A.5.2). The baseline survey covered over 98 percent of trained farmers, while the end line included over 95 percent of baseline respondents. We

\[\text{Selection into treatment is also a threat to the experiment's internal validity. By design, this is unlikely: group level participation subsidy treatments were revealed only after individuals arrived for training, and individual-level reward treatments were assigned in a one-on-one interaction with study enumerators.}\]
see some evidence that farmers who received lower take-up subsidies were marginally less likely \((p < 0.10)\) to participate in the surveys. Otherwise, survey attrition is balanced across treatments. For the tree survival monitoring, over 95 percent of the 1,092 households that took up the program were located.24

Finally, spillovers across treatments pose a threat to the experimental design. Because the take-up subsidy treatment was assigned at the group level, spillovers are relatively unlikely. The value of the threshold reward, on the other hand, varied at the individual level. By revealing the reward value privately to each farmer before the take-up decision, we mitigate the potential that take-up is affected by rewards received by others. However relative reward values may still affect performance since farmers can share information after they leave the training. We test for spillovers associated with the take-up subsidy and the threshold reward and observe little evidence that they affected outcomes (these tests and their findings are reported in Appendix A.4.2).

4.1 Reduced form results

We examine the data for three pieces of reduced form evidence. First, we examine how the incentive offered by the threshold reward affects tree survival outcomes and also indicators of farmer investments in the trees. Second, we look for reduced form evidence consistent with the presence of uncertainty. Third, we briefly address alternative explanations including liquidity constraints and behavioral decision-making.

The effect of economic incentives on follow-through and farmer investments.

Table 1 displays means and standard deviations for several program outcomes: take-up, follow-through (tree survival \(\geq 35\)), zero surviving trees and the number of trees conditional

\[24\text{Of the farmers eligible for monitoring, we were unable to locate 9 of them and thus assume zero tree survival in the analysis.}\]
on positive survival rates. These statistics are broken down by treatment and show clear patterns in responses to the incentives offered in the experiment.

The reward amount has a positive effect on follow-through, both in the likelihood that farmers reach the 35-tree threshold and in the absolute number of trees. This can be seen first in Panel C of Table 1, which in column 2 shows that the share of farmers that reached the 35-tree threshold increases from 0.13 to 0.32 across reward groups in ascending order, and in column 3 shows a similarly monotonic relationship between the number of trees and the reward amount. Column 4 also shows that the share of farmers with zero surviving trees falls monotonically with the reward. We also look at the linear relationship between these three outcomes and the reward when we compare our data with the structural estimates (see Table 3). For example, the reward amount (in '000 ZMK) has a marginal effect of 0.044 surviving trees that is significant at the 1 percent level (column 7 of Panel A, Table 3).25

Consistent with the follow-through results, we find evidence that farmers’ investment choices are responsive to the reward (Appendix table A.5.3). Specifically, enumerators recorded signs of weeding, fire breaks, watering and burning during field monitoring visits at the end of the project. All of these activities are costly to the farmer and are likely to affect tree survival, the first three positively and the last negatively. A linear regression of the probability that the enumerator observed weeding, fire breaks and watering on the threshold reward value shows a positive effect on weeding, fire breaks and watering, with p-values of 0.059, 0.129, and 0.041 respectively. The coefficient on field burning, which threatens tree survival, is negative and statistically insignificant.

25The relationship between follow-through and the reward is unaffected by selection into the program based on reward amounts. We can show this by comparing the response to the reward across farmers who learned about the reward after choosing to take-up and farmers that knew about the reward before taking-up. The marginal effect of the reward is statistically similar in the two groups (see Appendix table A.4.1).
Table 1: Summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
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<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Take-up</td>
<td>35-tree threshold</td>
<td># trees</td>
<td># trees&gt; 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>27.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>sd</td>
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<td>0.44</td>
<td>14.31</td>
<td>0.48</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Panel A: full sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>A = 8000</th>
<th>A = 12000</th>
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<tr>
<td>mean</td>
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<tr>
<td>sd</td>
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<td>0.43</td>
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</table>

Panel B: by take up subsidy treatment

<table>
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<th>(70000,150000]</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sd</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C: by reward treatment

Notes: Means and standard deviations of take-up (column 1) and follow-through (columns 2-4) outcomes, by experimental treatment. Column 1 includes all farmers (N=1314). Columns 2-4 are conditional on take-up (N=1092). Column 2 reports the number of farmers who reached the performance reward threshold.
Reduced form evidence of uncertainty. We use the means and standard deviations presented in Table 1 to provide evidence for the presence of uncertainty, consistent with our conceptual model. Regression-based results are shown, for ease of comparison with simulations from the structural model, in Table 3. First, notice that take-up rates are increasing across values of the take-up subsidy. Take-up rates are high, on average, even in the zero subsidy condition, where over 70 percent of farmers take-up. This could be due to high known payoffs from follow-through, on average, or to high expected values driven by option value (see Proposition 4).

Second, we observe that follow-through rates vary considerably within treatment and are low, on average, with only 25 percent of farmers reaching the 35-tree threshold (column 2). This holds even in the zero subsidy condition, ruling out that farmers were certain about high payoffs associated with cultivating a large number of trees at the time of take-up. Low follow-through conditional on take-up is consistent with Proposition 2.26

Third, a large number of farmers abandon the technology altogether (have a survival of zero trees), even conditional on taking up with zero subsidy (37 percent, column 4). This rules out that farmers were certain about positive payoffs from a small number of trees at the time of take-up, as in Corollary 2.1 of our conceptual model.

Finally, we see no reduced form effect of the subsidy treatment on the likelihood of reaching the 35-tree threshold or of abandoning the technology (zero trees). We implement a two-sample t-test for equal means between the highest and lowest subsidy condition. For continuous tree survival, the probability of reaching the threshold (≥ 35 trees) and zero trees, the p-values are 0.63, 0.25 and 0.32, respectively. The linear regression test of the effect of the take-up subsidy on tree survival outcomes (shown in Table 3) is also statistically insignificant. This is consistent with Proposition 3, which states that the selection effect of subsidies will

26Behavioral explanations such as over-optimism or procrastination might also be consistent with high take-up and low-follow through, even at positive take-up prices. We discuss behavioral explanations consistent with the reduced form results, as well as the interpretation of the type of new information, in Section 7.
be diminished by high levels of uncertainty in the net benefits of follow-through.

We also examine whether outcomes can be explained by observables. Appendix table A.5.4 shows that, overall, observables explains relatively little of the variation in outcomes: the R-squared from a regression of outcomes on observables is 0.0296, 0.0297 and 0.0314 for take-up, reaching the 35-tree threshold and tree survival, respectively. Adding the treatment variables improves the explanatory power substantially (even numbered columns). The low explanatory power of observables further motivates our use of a structural model to estimate the heterogeneity across farmers at both take-up and follow-through.

Alternative mechanisms. In Appendix 4, we investigate potential alternative mechanisms underlying the reduced form evidence. First, we test whether liquidity constraints had an effect on take-up or self-selection. Second, we investigate psychological channels that may affect both the decision to take-up and to follow-through with the technology. We find little support for the empirical relevance of either explanation.

5 Model, identification and estimation

The reduced form results in Section 4 provide evidence that is consistent with uncertainty in the opportunity costs of follow-through. However, they do not rule out that, in addition to uncertainty, other sources of heterogeneity in costs may explain the lack of screening effect of the take-up cost. For instance, a zero or even negative correlation between follow-through rates and the take-up cost could emerge if there is a negative correlation between the privately optimal number of trees and the total profit farmers derive from them.\textsuperscript{27} In addition, the

\textsuperscript{27}A correlation (positive or negative) between the optimal scale and the level of profit can emerge from the joint distribution of the primitive parameters that govern a profit function (e.g. marginal costs, fixed costs, marginal benefits, etc.). For instance, Suri (2011) finds that low adoption rates of hybrid maize among farmers who seem to have high returns from adoption can be traced to a positive correlation between fixed costs and marginal benefits from adoption using a random coefficients model.
reduced form results do not offer any insight into the magnitude of the uncertainty that farmers face. To address these remaining questions, we adapt our simple theoretical model described in Section 2 to our empirical setting and explicitly estimate the distribution of random parameters governing a quasi-profit function (a “reduced form” profit function of sorts).

5.1 Farmer net benefits

General profit function. We begin with a general characterization of a farmer profits at time $t = 1$ as a function of the number of trees she decides to plant and care for:

$$\Pi(N) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{1}{(1+r)^t} \left( \alpha_0 N - \alpha_1 N^2 \right) - \gamma_0 N - \gamma_1 N^2 - \gamma_2 \times 1(N > 0)$$

where $N$ is the number of trees, the term in brackets corresponds to the discounted flow of benefits, and the remaining terms represent variable and fixed cost. Equation (2) describes a convex function in the number of trees cultivated provided that all parameters are positive and $\tau \alpha_0 - \gamma_0 \geq 0$, where $\tau = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{1}{(1+r)^t}$.

The solution to the profit maximization problem defined by (2) is:

$$N^* = \begin{cases} \frac{\tau \alpha_0 - \gamma_0}{2(\tau \alpha_1 + \gamma_1)} & \text{if } \frac{(\tau \alpha_0 - \gamma_0)^2}{4(\tau \alpha_1 + \gamma_1)} - \gamma_2 > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } \frac{(\tau \alpha_0 - \gamma_0)^2}{4(\tau \alpha_1 + \gamma_1)} - \gamma_2 \leq 0 \end{cases}$$

where $\tau = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{1}{(1+r)^t}$. The existence of interior and corner solutions to this function is consistent with two empirical observations: many farmers choose to cultivate zero trees and a number of them find it optimal to cultivate between zero and 50 trees (the number of seedlings they receive) in the absence of an external incentive.\(^{28}\)

\(^{28}\)See Appendix figure A.3.1
The differences in tree choices across farmers could emerge from heterogeneity in some or all parameters in (2). Our experimental variation, however, does not allow us to separately identify heterogeneity along all of these dimensions. We therefore turn to a quasi-profit function that uses our experimental variation to characterize farmer heterogeneity along two important dimensions of the farmer’s profit maximization problem: the interior solution and the profit level evaluated at the optimal number of trees.

**Quasi-profit function and farmer’s decision at \( t = 1 \).** The same interior and corner solutions conditions delivered by (2) are generated by the following quasi-profit function indexed by two random parameters, \( T_i \) and \( F_i \):

\[
\Pi(N) = N - \frac{1}{2T_i}N^2 - F_i \times 1(N > 0) + 1(N \geq \bar{N})R_i
\]

where \( T_i = \frac{\tau_{\alpha_0} - \gamma_0}{2(\tau_{\alpha_1} + \gamma_1)} \), \( F_i = \gamma_2 + \left( \frac{(\tau_{\alpha_0} - \gamma_0) - (\tau_{\alpha_0} - \gamma_0)^2}{4(\tau_{\alpha_1} + \gamma_1)} \right) \), and \( R_i = 0 \). The quasi-profit function in (3) allows for heterogeneity across farmers in two “reduced form” parameters (in the structural sense): \( T_i \), the interior solution, and \( F_i \), which is a scaling parameter that ensures maximum profits in the quasi-profit function coincide with profits in the generic quadratic function. A free correlation structure is key to their interpretation as reduced form parameters, since they are a function of several common structural parameters. A negative or zero correlation between them could generate the type of selection patterns we observe in the data: zero correlation between the take-up cost and reaching the tree survival threshold.

The advantage of the quasi-profit function (3) over (2) is that the joint distribution of its two random parameters is identified out of the variation induced by our experiment: the last term in (3) corresponds to the exogenous threshold reward, which we vary randomly across farmers. The reduced form nature of (3) means that we do not need to specify which structural parameters in (2) are driving the variation in choices. And yet, since (2) and (3)
share the same value at the optimal solution, we can still use (3) to evaluate welfare under the more general profit function (2).

**Tree survival as a farmer decision.** Throughout our estimation, we assume that tree survival is deterministic conditional on farmers' costly effort. As we explain in greater detail in Appendix 3, this assumption is also consistent with a model where survival is probabilistic and the probability of survival is a convex continuous function of effort, $e$, up to $\tilde{e}$, where it attains one. Farmers would respond to such probability profile by investing the minimum effort that guarantees survival, $\tilde{e}$, in all trees they choose to plant.\(^{29}\) Empirically, the small bunching of tree survival at 35 (the reward threshold) we observe in the data is consistent with this assumption (see Appendix 3).

### 5.2 Dynamics and take-up decision

As in the conceptual model, we assume the farmer makes adoption-related decisions in two periods: $t = 0, 1$. The random parameter $F_i$, which largely determines the magnitude of optimized profits, is divided into two additive components: $F_{0i}$ and $F_{1i}$, where $F_{0i}$ is known at all periods and $F_{1i}$ is known at $t = 1$ but not at $t = 0$.\(^{30}\) In addition, we assume that $T_i$ is known to the farmer at all times. This amounts to assuming that there is uncertainty about the net returns to tree cultivation, but not about the optimal scale of the technology. The advantage of this particular structure of information is that it allows us to nest a model without uncertainty (i.e., $\text{Var}(F_{1i}) = 0$) that could also deliver no screening effects (or even negative screening effects) within our more general model.

At $t = 0$, the farmer decides whether or not to pay to take-up the technology. At this point in time, the farmer has partial information about her net benefits from the contract.

\(^{29}\)Except, perhaps, on one of them, as is explained in Appendix 3.

\(^{30}\)See the last paragraph of Section 3.2 for a discussion on our two-period assumption.
Assuming the farmer knows the distribution of $F_1_i$ conditional on $F_0_i$ and $T_i$ at $t = 0$, the farmer chooses to take-up if

$$\delta E_{F_1_i|F_0_i,T_i} \left[ \max_N \Pi(T_i, F_0_i, F_1_i, T_i, R_i) \right] - c + A_i \geq 0$$

(4)

where $c$ is the cost of the seedlings, $A_i$ is the randomly determined subsidy, and $\delta$ is the discount factor, assumed equal to 0.6.\(^{31}\) Note that this representation of the NPV of farmer’s profits from trees maintains the risk neutrality assumption from Section 2.\(^{32}\)

### 5.3 Identification and estimation

Identification of the structural model consists of uniquely identifying the joint distribution of unobservables $T_i$, $F_0_i$ and $F_1_i$. In addition to the above described assumptions on the timing of information, we maintain assumptions (i) and (ii) on the components of $F_i$ from Section 2, and add the following assumptions

(iii) No common shocks: $F_1_i \perp F_1_j \ \forall i \neq j$

(iv) Normality: $F_0_i \sim n(\mu_{F_0}, \sigma_{F_0}^2)$, $F_1_i \sim n(0, \sigma_{F_1}^2)$

(v) Joint normality: $(F_i, \ln T_i) \sim n(\mu, \Sigma)$

Below we explain the role that each of these assumptions plays for identification. In what follows, we denote the randomized values of $A_i$ and $R_i$ as $a_i$ and $r_i$ to emphasize their role as known (to the farmer and researcher) and exogenous.

\(^{31}\)Like Stange (2012), we note that in the context of stochastic dynamic structural models the discount factor is not separately identified from the scale parameter of future period shocks. We used survey data on time preferences to inform our choice of 0.6, which is in line with observed interest rates in our setting and elicited individual discount rates in other rural developing country settings (Conning and Udrey 2007; Cardenas and Carpenter 2008).

\(^{32}\)As discussed in Section 2, this assumption is innocuous to the extent that the changes in income produced by our program are small relative to total income. The highest reward from our program is roughly 3.5 percent of average annual income.
With no assumptions other than profit-maximizing behavior on behalf of the farmer and a quadratic profit function that allows for corner solutions, the joint distribution of $F_i$ and $T_i$ can be non-parametrically identified in the subset of the support such that $\bar{N} < T_i < 50$. To see this, consider the follow-through decision of the subset of the sample for which

$$\lim_{a \to A_i} \Pr \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \max_{N} \Pi(N|T_i, F_{0i}, F_{1i}, T_i, r_i) \big| F_{0i}, T_i \right] \geq c - a_i \right) = 1,$$

such that there is no selection on take-up. Within this subset of the sample, we can use the variation in $r_i$ to identify the joint distribution of $(F_i, T_i)$. For this group, the probability of cultivating $N^* = n > \bar{N}$ trees when $R = r_i$ can be written as

$$\Pr(N^* = n; R = r_i) = \Pr \left( F_i < r_i + \frac{1}{2}n \big| T_i = n \right) \Pr (T_i = n) \quad (5)$$

Because the left hand side of (5) is empirically observable, increments in $r_i$, holding $n$ constant, trace out the conditional distribution of $F_i$ given $T_i$. The same expression can then be used to recover the marginal distribution of $T_i$ by varying $n$ and dividing by the conditional distribution of $F_i$. Since non-parametric identification of the joint distribution of $F_i$ and $T_i$ occurs only in the subset of the support such that $\bar{N} < T_i < 50$, additional parametric assumptions are required to fully characterize these distributions. We therefore adopt assumption (v) for the estimation.

We use farmers’ take-up decisions in combination with assumptions (i)-(iv) in order to separately identify the distributions of $F_{0i}$ and $F_{1i}$, once the joint distribution of $F_i$ and $T_i$ has been identified. Under these assumptions, the decision to take-up in response to $r_i$ and $a_i$ provides independent identification of the distribution of the known component of $F_i, F_{0i}$. More formally, identification of the distribution of $F_{0i}$ is obtained from the decision to take-up, which is characterized by the inequality in (4). The left side of (4) is a known
function of the random variable \( F_{0i} \). Note that parameters \( \mu_F, \sigma_F^2, \mu_T, \sigma_T^2 \), and \( \rho_{T,F} \) can be treated as known since they are identified from tree survival as described above. Denote this function \( h(F_{0i}; r_i) \), so we can rewrite (4) as

\[
h(F_{0i}; r_i) \geq c - a_i
\]

(6)

The right side of (6) can take one of four known values, as \( a_i \in \{0, 4000, 8000, 12000\} \). The left hand side of (6) is known up to \( F_{0i} \) and varies across individuals in response to the known cost determinant, \( r_i \). Provided that \( h(F_{0i}; r_i) \) is invertible,\(^{33}\) we can identify the distribution of \( F_{0i} \), from the random variation in \( a_i \) and \( r_i \):

\[
\Pr \left( F_{0i} \leq h^{-1}(c - a_i, r_i) | \mu_F, \sigma_F^2, \mu_T, \sigma_T^2, \rho_{T,F} \right) = \Pr(TakeUp_i | a_i, r_i) \quad \text{(7)}
\]

**Common shocks and mean shift model.** Assumption (iii) plays an important role for identification, as it implies that the variance of \( F_i \) across farmers is the sum of the variances of its two components: \( \sigma_{F_0}^2 + \sigma_{F_1}^2 \).\(^{34}\) The variance of shocks is thus partially identified from subtracting the variance estimate of \( F_{0i} \), identified from (7), from the variance of \( F_i \), identified from tree choices. Shocks that are common across farmers do not translate into variance in tree choices, and would lead to an underestimate of \( \sigma_{F_1}^2 \). In our context, much of the uncertainty farmers face appears to be from idiosyncratic shocks. According to our survey, two-thirds of respondents list health problems as their greatest challenge, almost 50 percent of households report losing cattle or livestock to death or theft during the past year, and 10 percent of households report the death or marriage of a working age member.\(^{35}\) However, given that farmers are also likely affected by common shocks such as

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\(^{33}\)It can be shown that there exists some \( \bar{f} \) s.t. \( h(F_{0i}; r_i) \) is strictly monotonically decreasing on \( (-\infty, \bar{f}) \).

\(^{34}\)Assumption (iii) is also present in Fafchamps (1993), and is necessary for maximum likelihood estimation.

\(^{35}\)This is consistent with a literature that documents, in most cases, a disproportionate share of income risk from idiosyncratic factors in rural developing country settings (summarized in Dercon 2002).
rainfall patterns and commodity prices, we estimate a variant of our model that allows for a specific type of common shock: one that is completely unforeseen at the time of take-up and is common across all farmers. This model variant can be estimated by relaxing assumption (ii), i.e. allowing for subjective and objective expectations about the mean of the shock to differ. Thus we refer to this model as the *mean shift model*. The mean shift – or difference between the subjective mean of the shock distribution at take-up and its objective mean – is identified because the random variation in $r_i$ and $a_i$ allows us to identify $\mu_F$ in (7) from the take-up decisions independently of the estimate from tree choices. Besides allowing us to incorporate a type of common shock, the mean shift also captures any over-optimism or experimenter demand effects that are common across farmers. These behaviors will share the same structure as the unforseen common shock: the subjective mean will differ from the objective mean of the opportunity cost distribution.

**Estimation.** We estimate the model using simulated maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood function is over observations of the number of planted trees, $N = 0, \ldots, 50$, and the participation decision, $DP = 0, 1$. The sample includes the 1,314 farmers who made a take-up decision. Because there are no trees planted whenever the individual chooses not to participate, the support of this bivariate vector is given by the 52 $(DP, N)$ pairs: $(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2), \ldots, (1, 50)$.

$$l(\xi; DP, N) = \sum_{i=1}^{M} \left\{ (1-DP_i) \ln(1-\pi_{P,i}) + DP_i \ln(\pi_{P,i}) + DP_i \sum_{j=0}^{50} 1(N_i = j) \ln \Pr(N = j) \right\}$$

where $\xi = (\mu_F, \sigma^2_{F_0}, \sigma^2_{F_1}, \mu_T, \sigma^2_T, \rho_{F,T})$.

We use numerical methods to minimize the negative of the simulated log-likelihood. For each likelihood evaluation, we use 1,500 draws of $(T_i, F_{0i}, F_{1i})$. Within each likelihood evaluation and for each draw of $(T_i, F_{0i}, F_{1i})$, the expectation on the right hand side of equation (4) is numerically computed using 100 draws of $(T_i, F_{1i})$ conditional on the draw of $F_{0i}$. Simulated methods often result in stepwise objective functions which work poorly with gradient-based

---

36 Standard errors for the estimated parameters are obtained as the inverse of the inner
product of the simulated scores.\textsuperscript{37}

6 Structural estimates and simulation results

In this section, we describe the structural estimates and carry out counterfactual simulations.

6.1 Structural estimates and model fit

Table 2 shows the point estimates for the main parameters described in Section 5.3.\textsuperscript{38} Panel A shows the estimates of our baseline model, which assumes that farmers’ expectations about $F$ are correct and consistent over time. Panel B shows the results of allowing for an unexpected common shock to all farmers at $t = 1$ (a mean shift). Because point estimates are somewhat hard to interpret (e.g. the $\mu_T$ and $\sigma_T$ parameters do not correspond to the mean and standard deviation of the log-normally distributed parameter $T$), we convert the estimated parameters numerical optimization algorithms. To facilitate the numerical optimization, we “smooth” the objective function by computing the multilogit formula for each decision over participation and the number of trees. We assume a relatively small variance parameter of the logistic error term: 0.5. However, we experiment with different values for this parameter. We find that smoothing does not significantly affect the point estimates and does improve substantially the curvature of our objective function. A further discussion of the estimation algorithm can be found in Appendix A.2.

\textsuperscript{37}See Appendix A.2 for a more detailed description of our standard error calculation.
\textsuperscript{38}There are two remaining parameters that are omitted from Table 2 but discussed in Appendix A.2 for the sake of brevity: these are the surprise treatment parameter, $\alpha_S$, and the monitoring treatment parameter, $\alpha_m$. Recall that farmers in the surprise reward treatment made a take-up decision before learning their reward. We model this aspect of the design by assuming individuals expect a threshold reward of 0 when their participation decision is made, but incorporate the reward value they draw in their follow-through decision. Because our reduced form results show that individuals in the surprise treatment had higher participation rates than those individuals who drew a reward of zero ZMK, we allowed the surprise reward treatment to have an independent effect on the participation decision. The structural estimates suggest that the boost to participation is equivalent to offering them between 92 and 54 ZMK (in the base and mean shifter models, respectively). Appendix A.2 describes these results in more detail.

In all models, we allow the regular visits to collect data on program implementation that were administered to one-fifth of farmers to independently affect the tree survival decision (but not the participation decision). The estimated parameter is -238.40 (s.e. 73.887) in Panel A and -229.53 (s.e. 74.444) in Panel B. In other words, regular monitoring visits appears to be reducing the fixed costs of tree cultivation, which is consistent with the positive effect of monitoring on tree survival that we find in the reduced form results.

33
into more easily interpretable outcomes using simulation. The estimated joint distribution of $T$ and $F$ shown in Panel A is such that the mean ex-post privately optimal number of trees is 8.46 (s.d. 14.64), with about 59 percent of farmers choosing to plant no trees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters in $T$</th>
<th>$\mu_T$</th>
<th>$\sigma_T$</th>
<th>$\rho$</th>
<th>Parameters in $F$</th>
<th>$\mu_F$</th>
<th>$\sigma_F0$</th>
<th>$\sigma_F1$</th>
<th>$\alpha_s$</th>
<th>$\alpha_m$</th>
<th>$\mu_{Fs}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panel A. No Mean Shift</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$\mu_T$</td>
<td>3.539</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\sigma_T$</td>
<td>1.401</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.818</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$\mu_F$</td>
<td>107.58</td>
<td>(11.822)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$\sigma_F0$</td>
<td>307.87</td>
<td>(93.278)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\sigma_F1$</td>
<td>211.42</td>
<td>(49.953)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$\alpha_s$</td>
<td>-91.79</td>
<td>(16.222)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\alpha_m$</td>
<td>-238.40</td>
<td>(73.887)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$\mu_{Fs}$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panel B. Allowing for Mean Shift</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\mu_T$</td>
<td>3.579</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\sigma_T$</td>
<td>1.392</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\mu_F$</td>
<td>74.48</td>
<td>(15.47)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\sigma_F0$</td>
<td>290.06</td>
<td>(84.622)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\sigma_F1$</td>
<td>193.05</td>
<td>(45.427)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\alpha_s$</td>
<td>-54.42</td>
<td>(20.47)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\alpha_m$</td>
<td>-229.53</td>
<td>(74.444)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\mu_{Fs}$</td>
<td>53.29</td>
<td>(26.761)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Parameters fitted by simulated maximum likelihood using 1500 draws of the random vector $(F_{0i}, F_{1i}, T_i)$, with smoothing (lambda is 0.5) and tolerance (1e-15). The baseline model (Panel A) restricts the mean of $F_i$ to be the same in both time periods. The mean shift model (Panel B) allows the mean of $F_i$ to differ between the two periods, and the parameter $F_{shift}$ to capture this difference. The log-likelihood value for the baseline model is $11142.064$, while it is $11138.996$ for the mean shift model.

This joint distribution also implies that the average ex-post private profit from the optimal number of trees is 108.39 thousand ZMK. However, ex-post private profits vary widely across farmers: the s.d. is 185.47. Importantly, the model estimates that about 39 percent of the variance in ex-post profits is due to new information that emerges after the take-up decision is made. To put this magnitude into perspective, among farmers whose expected number of trees is above the reward threshold at the time of take-up, around 15 percent prefer a number below the threshold after new information is revealed.

The variance of shocks is partially identified out of the difference in the variances of

---

39 The point estimates in Table 2 can be used to simulate farmer’s draws of $F$ and $T$. These draws are then used to compute optimal tree cultivation decisions that account for interior and corner solutions, which are then be plugged back into the profit function to compute maximized profit. The statistics presented here correspond to means and variances from 10,000 simulated draws.

40 These statistics assume that farmers can plant a maximum of 50 trees. Although we allow for the distribution of $T$ to be unbounded, we present statistics of the bounded distribution because we fit the econometric model using only this range of outcomes. According to our estimates, about 6 percent of the farmers would choose a private optimum of 50 or more trees.
expected profits at take-up ($t = 0$) and ex-post profits at the time the follow-through decision is made ($t = 1$) and partially identified out of its non-linear effect on the mean level of the expected profits at take-up.\footnote{Recall that a higher variance in shocks results in a larger option value for the contract.} The presence of common shocks will generate a tug-of-war between these two sources of identification: the expected value of the profits will pull the variance of shocks parameter, $\sigma_{F_1}$, up while the ex-post variance in profits will not reflect the variance of common shocks and thus will pull $\sigma_{F_1}$ down. Our mean shift model helps us explore the importance of the bias in $\sigma_{F_1}$ generated by the presence of common shocks, by allowing the mean level of profits to be different at $t = 0$ and $t = 1$.

The corresponding results from the mean shift model are presented in Panel B of Table 2. The estimated difference in means between the two periods, the mean shift, is given by parameter $\mu_{F_S}$. A non-zero value for this estimated parameter has a couple of plausible interpretations. First, it can represent a single common shock whose possibility was unknown at the time of take-up and affected all farmers equally. Second, it can pick up a common update in the value for the technology that occurred after the take-up decision was made. The latter interpretation is a useful test for the presence of experimenter demand effects on take-up: the perceived obligation of potential adopters to take-up in the presence of the experimenter. Our estimate of the value for $\mu_{F_S}$ is positive but small and not significantly different from zero at standard confidence levels. The positive value is consistent with either the presence of a common shock of the specific type described above or an experimenter demand effect. Note, however, that in either case, it is small compared to the standard deviation of the shocks, $\sigma_{F_1}$. And, importantly, allowing for this effect induces a small change in the variance of the shocks: $\sigma_{F_1}$, falls moderately from 211.42 to 193.05, which is consistent with a positive bias in our baseline model stemming from the presence of common shocks.\footnote{Unfortunately, we cannot calculate the share of the variance attributed to common shocks using model estimates since we are not explicitly modeling random common shocks with a known distribution at the time.
that experimenter demand effects are not driving our results.

We now turn to the interpretation of the parameters that govern the distribution of known (at the time of take-up) sources of heterogeneity across farmers. We estimate a high positive correlation between $F$ and $\ln T$, $\rho_{T,F} = 0.81$ ($\rho_{T,F} = 0.83$ in the mean shift model). Because $F$ enters negatively in the profit function, this translates into a negative correlation between the privately optimal number of trees and the level of profits. This negative correlation generates low, but strictly positive, follow-through rates (as in low numbers of trees planted) among farmers whose expected value from the contract is high and thus take-up under a high price. In other words, the static heterogeneity identified by the model contributes to undermining the effect of high prices at take-up on positive (high follow-through) self-selection of farmers.

Because $F$ and $T$ are reduced form parameters (see Section 5.1), the positive correlation between them could stem from two sources: a positive correlation between farmers’ fixed costs and farmers’ interior solution to the maximization problem (a component of the reduced form random parameter, $F$, is the fixed cost of the generic quadratic profit function), or a high mean and high variance in the linear term of net marginal returns (the term $\tau_0 - \gamma_0$ in the reduced form expression for $T$ and $F$), which enters linearly in $T$ and non-linearly in $F$, and in high ranges may generate a negative relationship between them. Our model predicts well some simple observations in the data. For example, our baseline model predicts that 1,104 farmers (1,112 under the mean shift model), out of a total of 1,314, will take-up; our data show 1,092 participants. Our model also predicts that 173 out of the 963 farmers that faced a strictly positive take-up cost (i.e. a subsidy less than 12,000 ZMK) will choose to cultivate zero trees (180 in the mean shift model), while the observed number of farmers in

\footnote{\textsuperscript{43} $F_1$ is assumed to be orthogonal to $F_0$ and $T$. Thus, the correlation between $F$ and $T$ stems solely from the correlation between $F_0$ (the known component of $F$) and $T$.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{44} We verified this is the case for plausible distributions of the deep structural parameters via simulation.}
This category is 112. That is, the dynamics in our model replicate an observation that seems at odds with rationality in a static framework: some farmers who purchase the trees choose not to cultivate them. In this sense, our result parallels the result by Fafchamps (1993) in that individuals make costly choices to maximize future flexibility.

Next, we further examine the model fit by comparing the reduced form treatment effects using simulated outcomes from the estimated model and the observed data. Most of the magnitudes and signs between the treatments and outcomes are well matched by our model estimates. Panel A of Table 3 shows results with the observed data, while Panels B and C show the corresponding simulations using the estimates from Table 2. Columns 1-4 estimate the effect of a thousand ZMK increase in the subsidy on take-up and follow-through outcomes. Columns 5-8 repeat the regressions with the reward (in '000 ZMK) on the righthand side. The effect of the subsidy and the reward on take-up (columns 1 and 5) and whether the farmer reached the 35-tree threshold (columns 2 and 4, conditional on take-up) are similar across the observed and simulated data. The effect of the reward on zero tree survival is also very similar in the observed and simulated data.

There are, however, some discrepancies between what our model predicts and the observed data. Columns 3 and 7 show the effect of the take-up subsidy and reward on the number of surviving trees, excluding zeros (which are shown in columns 4 and 8). Interestingly, the sign of the coefficient on the subsidy is different between the observed and simulated data, though standard errors are relatively large. The effect of the reward on the number of trees (column 7) is larger in the simulated data, consistent with the effects on reaching the 35-tree threshold. Finally, we see evidence that the take-up subsidy selects for farmers more likely to keep zero trees alive (column 4) in the simulated but not in the observed data, indicating some selection effect on abandoning the technology altogether in the simulated data only. Using simulations, we explore whether some of the discrepancies between our estimated model and the data stem from the assumption of deterministic survival of the
Table 3: Comparison of structural and reduced form estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Take-up</th>
<th>(2) Follow-through</th>
<th>(3) # trees</th>
<th>(4) 1.(zero trees)</th>
<th>(5) Take-up</th>
<th>(6) Follow-through</th>
<th>(7) # trees</th>
<th>(8) 1.(zero trees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Take-up subsidy</td>
<td>0.022***</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.229</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>1,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel A. Observed Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Take-up</th>
<th>(2) Follow-through</th>
<th>(3) # trees</th>
<th>(4) 1.(zero trees)</th>
<th>(5) Take-up</th>
<th>(6) Follow-through</th>
<th>(7) # trees</th>
<th>(8) 1.(zero trees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Take-up subsidy</td>
<td>0.020***</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td>0.092***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>1,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.011</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Panel B. No Mean Shift

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Take-up</th>
<th>(2) Follow-through</th>
<th>(3) # trees</th>
<th>(4) 1.(zero trees)</th>
<th>(5) Take-up</th>
<th>(6) Follow-through</th>
<th>(7) # trees</th>
<th>(8) 1.(zero trees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Take-up subsidy</td>
<td>0.020***</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td>0.094***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>605</td>
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<td>1,120</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.013</td>
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</table>

Panel C. Allowing for Mean Shift

Notes: This table shows coefficients from regressions of each of four indicator variables (take-up, follow-through (threshold), tree survival larger than zero, and no tree survival) on each of our randomized treatments (take-up subsidy and threshold reward). Panel A shows these regression outcomes for the true data. Panel B and C show the fit of the structural model by simulating all four outcomes using the model estimates and examining the how much the linear relationships between outcomes and treatments resemble those in Panel A. Panel B uses baseline model estimates (Panel A of Table 2), while Panel C uses estimates from the mean shift model (Panel B of Table 2). Column 5 is estimated for farmers who learned about the reward before making their take-up decision only.
trees conditional on effort by introducing a stochastic component to tree survival outcomes, taking parameter estimates as given. We find little to no improvement when stochasticity is introduced into the tree survival outcomes (see Appendix A.3).

6.2 The effect of uncertainty on farmer profit and program outcomes

We use estimates from the structural model to perform counterfactual simulations of farmer profits and program outcomes (take-up and tree survival) under different levels of uncertainty. For these analyses, we use the results from the model with the mean shift parameter, such that both the mean and the standard deviation of $F_1$ may vary over time (Panel B in Table 2). In the simulated results below, we set the mean shift for $t = 1$, $\mu_{F_1}$, equal to zero, so that we can equate the expected benefits with the true average discounted benefits from the program.\footnote{This treatment of the mean shift parameter is consistent with the common-shock interpretation of this parameter.} Results from using our baseline model estimates are qualitatively similar.

**Farmer profits**

We begin by examining the effect of uncertainty on the average per-farmer expected private profit (right hand side of inequality 1) implied by the empirical model. In order to do so, we simulate the value of the expected profit for each farmer at different values of $\sigma_{F_1}$. The relationship between the mean expected profit and $\sigma_{F_1}$ corresponds to the solid black curves in Figure 2. Panel A shows the relationship for a reward of zero and Panel B for the largest reward offered (150 thousand ZMK). Both are shown at a full subsidy, so that take-up is 100 percent (i.e. there is no selection on the take-up price).
**Expected farmer profits are increasing in uncertainty.** This result is analogous to the theoretical result discussed in Proposition 4: the option value from the contract increases with uncertainty and thus drives a positive relationship between the expected profit and uncertainty. The option value, as defined in Appendix 1, is shown by the dashed lines in Figure 2 for different values of the reward. The option value is always non-negative, and is also the only component of the expected private profit that varies with uncertainty. Recall that this result stems from the asymmetric response of the expected profit to positive and negative shocks: if the realization of the random component of the profit drives it below zero, the farmer will respond by not cultivating any trees at all (effectively bounding the profit realizations at zero). This optimizing behavior turns the high variance of the shocks into an asset of the contract, which in turn results in higher take-up.

The positive relationship between expected private profit and uncertainty has implications for take-up decisions: under higher uncertainty, more farmers are ex ante attracted to the contract, even though its ex post expected value is unchanged. A high enough level of uncertainty may result in an expected profit that exceeds even an unsubsidized take-up cost. Hence, the ability of the take-up cost to “tease out” those who will be more likely to reach the tree survival threshold decreases with uncertainty. This can be observed more directly when looking at take-up and follow-through outcomes as a function of uncertainty, which we turn to next.
Program outcomes

Figure 3 plots average take-up at low and high subsidies (dashed and solid lines) and low (Panel A) and high (Panel B) rewards as a function of uncertainty. Panels C and D show the share of individuals who reach the 35-tree threshold conditional on take-up for the same combinations of subsidies and rewards. Figure 4 shows the effects of uncertainty on the average number of trees for different values of the subsidy \( A \) and reward \( R \). Panels A and B show the average tree survival, unconditional on take-up (non-participants have zero surviving trees). Panels C and D show average tree survival conditional on take up. Because
take-up is 100 percent with a full subsidy (A=12), the solid lines in Panels C and D coincide with the solid lines in the Panels A and B, respectively.

Figure 3: Take-up and threshold outcomes as a function of uncertainty

Notes: This figure shows a counterfactual simulation of farmers’ average take-up and 35-tree reward threshold outcome as we vary the level of uncertainty (the standard deviation of \( F_1 \)). For the simulations, we use the estimated parameters from Panel B of Table 2, except for \( \sigma_{F_1} \), which we vary along the horizontal axis. Take-up and threshold (trees \( \geq 35 \)) outcomes are shown for different combinations of the reward value and take-up subsidy, both of which are shown in thousand ZMK.

When uncertainty is low, a higher take-up price increases tree survival conditional on take-up. This result can be seen from the difference between the two lines in Panels C and D, and is what we refer to as the selection effect of price. The existence of a selection effect for low levels of uncertainty, is analogous to Proposition 1 in our conceptual model (Section 2). For the level of uncertainty identified from our data (\( \sigma_{F_1} = 195 \)), the
gain in tree survival from charging more at take-up is modest – less than 5 trees – and it continues falling as uncertainty increases. The reduction in the selection effect as uncertainty increases is analogous to Proposition 3 in our conceptual model.

When the price for take-up is high, uncertainty lowers follow-through conditional on take-up. This result is shown by the downward slope of the dashed line with circles in Panels C and D in Figure 4. This reduction in tree survival is driven by the selection effect of the take-up price decreasing as uncertainty increases: as shown by Panels A and B in Figure 3, take-up converges to 100 percent as uncertainty increases, making the pool of takers ever more similar to the overall pool. This is broadly consistent with Proposition 2 from our conceptual model, although the result in this richer model is qualified by an additional competing effect: the variance of shocks can have a positive or negative effect on the number of farmers that choose zero trees depending on whether the sign of this corner solution threshold is to the right or to the left of the mean of $F$. We call this effect the corner solution effect. It is positive whenever the threshold reward is 150 ZMK, and negative whenever the threshold reward is zero. Thus, when the reward is zero, we see that the unconditional average number of trees increases slightly with uncertainty (both lines in Panel A and the solid line in Panel C increase with $\sigma_{F_1}$). Thus, in this richer model, the effect of uncertainty on follow-through conditional on take-up carries both effects: the selection effect, which lowers follow-through; and the corner solution effect, which has an ambiguous effect on follow-through. In our context, the selection effect dominates the corner solution effect, and thus follow-through falls with uncertainty conditional on take-up. That average

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46This effect holds whenever the distribution of shocks is continuous and symmetric around the mean. To see this, denote the standard normal cdf as $\Phi(.)$ and the threshold along the support of $F$ above which the private profit associated with the interior solution is negative as $\tilde{F}$. The probability of choosing to plant zero trees takes the form $1 - \Phi \left( \frac{\tilde{F} - \mu_F}{\sigma_{F_0} + \sigma_{F_1}} \right)$. Note that the derivative of this probability with respect to $\sigma_{F_1}$ has the same sign as the numerator of the argument of $\Phi(.)$. When $R = 0$, $\tilde{F} = \frac{1}{2} T_i$. Given that $\mu_F$ is above 100 and the mode of $T_i$ is 8.9, the numerator tends to be negative. However, when $R = 150$ and $N^* \geq 35$, $\tilde{F} = N^* - \frac{1}{2\pi} N^{*2} + 150$; and, thus, the numerator tends to be positive.
follow-through conditional on take-up falls with uncertainty has implications for technologies whose benefits kick in above a certain “usage” level: under low levels of uncertainty about implementation costs, a high cost of take-up will help select those individuals who are likely to engage in more intensive usage of the technology.

**The effect of a high subsidy on take-up may dominate its effects on selection.** This result is most clearly seen by comparing unconditional tree survival (Panels A and B of Figure 4) with tree survival conditional on take-up, which excludes the take-up effect (Panels C and D). The boost associated with the selection effect observed at low levels of uncertainty in Panels C and D is more than offset by the take-up effect: many more farmers take-up when subsidies are high (see Panels A and B in Figure 3). The two counteracting effects lead to similar average tree survival across subsidy levels, unconditional on take-up (Panels A and B). Hence, for technologies whose benefits kick in with total follow-through (whether or not follow-through is spread about few or many adopters), subsidies may increase the benefits of adoption. Note, however, that uncertainty also lowers the take-up advantage of high subsidies, as take-up increases with uncertainty for all subsidy levels.

**When uncertainty is high, a reward conditional on follow-through is more effective at inducing tree survival than a subsidy.** This result can be appreciated when comparing the effect of moving from a lower $R$ to a higher $R$ as compared to moving from a low $A$ to a high $A$. Even with the optimal (in our setting) combination of a low take-up subsidy and high threshold reward, uncertainty can bring down the number of farmers that reach the 35-tree threshold.
Figure 4: Tree survival as a function of uncertainty

Notes: This figure shows a counterfactual simulation of farmers’ mean number of surviving trees as we vary the level of uncertainty (the standard deviation of $F_1$). For the simulations, we use the estimated parameters from Panel B of Table 2, except for $\sigma_{F_1}$, which we vary along the horizontal axis. The mean number of surviving trees is shown for different combinations of the external threshold reward and the subsidy for take-up, both of which are shown in thousand ZMK. The top panels show per-farmer tree survival for all farmers (those who didn’t take up have zero trees); the bottom panels show tree survival conditional on take-up.
7 Discussion and interpretation

Our model and results are consistent with several interpretations of intertemporal adoption decisions and the nature of the uncertainty that farmers face. Our preferred interpretation is one of idiosyncratic and common shocks to the opportunity cost of follow-through with the technology, with idiosyncratic shocks playing a relatively more important role. We describe supplementary evidence on alternative interpretations and explanations in this section.

7.1 Learning

Our theoretical and empirical models are similar, from an ex ante perspective, if the information that arrives between $t = 0$ and $t = 1$ is a persistent (learning) or transient shock to opportunity cost, provided that both types of new information are independent across farmers. In addition, to the extent that learning shocks are common across all farmers and unexpected, the mean shift model could account for learning. Interpreted this way, the positive mean shift estimate is consistent with farmers systematically underestimating the costs of follow-through at the time of take-up. The small estimated magnitude of the mean shift parameter would then imply little systematic updating across all farmers. Learning shocks that are independent across farmers and whose distribution is known by the farmers ex ante would show up in the variance of $F_1$. Thus, we cannot distinguish between persistent and transitory shocks to the opportunity costs of cultivating trees.

The potential for learning about the value of the technology during the first year of tree cultivation is limited given that tree survival benefits are not realized until several years after the end of the study, and planting and caring for trees resembles activities that farmers undertake regularly. Thus, if learning occurs, it is likely related to the opportunity costs of cultivating the trees, rather than the benefits. We use survey data to explore the extent to which baseline knowledge of the technology affects the results. Specifically, we expect that
farmers who had more baseline knowledge have less to learn and are therefore less likely to end up with zero surviving trees if they take-up under a positive price.

We construct three baseline knowledge measures: (1) whether the farmer had any *Faidherbia albida* on their land at baseline, (2) whether anyone in the farmer group had *Faidherbia albida* on their land at baseline, and (3) whether the farmer could name at least one risk to tree survival at baseline. Appendix table A.5.5 shows the results from a linear regression of the likelihood of having zero surviving trees on a knowledge variable, an indicator for paying a positive price and their interaction, conditional on take-up. Learning would predict a negative and significant interaction. We observe a negative and statistically insignificant interaction for the first two knowledge variables, and a positive and significant interaction for the third. In other words, we find no clear evidence that learning explains the pattern of take-up under a positive price coupled with zero surviving trees, which can be explained by transient shocks that arrive after take-up.

### 7.2 Procrastination

An alternative explanation that would violate our identifying assumptions is procrastination or hyperbolic time preferences. Sustained effort choices are frequently associated with time inconsistent behavior, in which the individuals initially takes up, intending to follow-through. But when the time comes to act, costs loom larger (or benefits smaller) than anticipated at the time of initial take-up decision. Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011) document time inconsistent technology adoption for insecticide treated bednets in India, with low rates of net re-treatment.

We examine evidence for procrastination or hyperbolic time preferences by constructing two measures of procrastination from the survey data (see Appendix Table A.5.6), which differentiate to some degree between naive and sophisticated procrastinators. We begin by
examining whether these measures of procrastination are correlated with contract take-up or tree survival conditional on take-up, controlling for other characteristics. They are not. We next investigate the insight that farmers prone to procrastination may be differentially sensitive to a contract structure that requires them to pay more upfront for inputs if the potential rewards arrive only after a year of effort. We regress take-up on an interaction of each of the two procrastination measures and the subsidy level. For the self-aware (sophisticated) procrastinators, there is a weakly greater likelihood of take-up at higher subsidy levels. However, the interaction is insignificant with the measure more likely to capture naive procrastinators. These results suggest a relatively minor role for procrastination in driving take-up or follow-through outcomes.

8 Conclusion

This paper shows that uncertainty can play an important role in the adoption of technologies that require costly effort over time. We provide a broad framework for adoption decisions that allows for both time-invariant and time-varying heterogeneity as well as multiple dimensions of static heterogeneity across potential adopters. This framework applies to many adoption decisions in agriculture, development, environment, and health research (for example, the adoption and adherence to medical treatments). In our conceptual model, we show that uncertainty in the opportunity cost of adoption can increase take-up rates at the cost of reducing average follow-through rates. Uncertainty at the time of take-up provides an additional explanation to what has been discussed in the technology adoption literature for why charging higher prices may be ineffective at selecting for adopters likely to follow-through at the time of take-up.

Findings from our field experiment show reduced form evidence that is consistent with our conceptual model, in the context of agricultural technology adoption. In Zambia, farmers
decide whether to take-up a nitrogen fixing tree under considerable uncertainty about the benefits and costs of following through to keep the trees alive. The experimental variation is used to identify a structural model of intertemporal decision making under uncertainty, which explains our field results and quantifies the uncertainty that the farmers face at the time of take-up. The structural model also helps distinguish between static and time-varying sources of heterogeneity that may explain the absence of screening effects of prices. We find that, in our setup, both static and time-varying heterogeneity reduce the screening effect of the take-up price. Counterfactual simulations indicate that reducing the uncertainty in our setting by half would increase the number of farmers that reach tree survival threshold by 18 percentage points (36 percent).

Like all empirical case studies, our data are specific to our setting. However, the combination of the experimental data with a structural model allows us to simulate adoption outcomes under different levels of uncertainty. Our results are consistent with more than one interpretation of what changes for farmers between the time of the take-up and the follow-through decisions. First, farmers may experience shocks, such as an illness in the household or the arrival of agricultural pests, that affect the opportunity cost of following through with the technology. Second, farmers may acquire additional information about the net costs of tree cultivation after take-up through learning by doing or learning from peers. From an ex ante modeling perspective, our general framework is agnostic about which explanation is correct. Though we cannot distinguish among them using our experimental design, supplementary evidence suggests that idiosyncratic shocks are important in our setting and that learning opportunities, while present, are minimal.

Our study is an example of how experimental variation can be used to identify dynamic structural models. The use of experimental variation in treatments at two different points in time offers an alternative to a panel data structure, since statistically independent samples are exposed to different treatment combinations. To our knowledge, this is the first paper
to introduce experimental variation in order to satisfy the exclusion restrictions needed for sequential identification. One caveat of our basic identification strategy is that it relies on shocks being independent across farmers. Therefore, a variant of our model allows for a uniform common shock to farmers, provided that it is completely unanticipated (i.e. the subjective probability assigned by farmers is zero).

From a policy standpoint, uncertainty has the effect of lowering adoption outcomes per dollar of subsidy invested, while increasing the expected private profits to the adopter, because the downside risk of take-up is bounded at zero. To the extent that subsidies rely on public funds, an increase in uncertainty represents an ex ante transfer from the public to the private domain, driven entirely by the adopter’s ability to re-optimize follow-through once new information becomes available. While stronger contracts that force adopters to follow-through once they take-up a subsidized technology would address the problem of high take-up coupled with low follow-through, they would do so at a clear cost to the adopter. Future research to explore more innovative solutions to encouraging both take-up and follow-through in the presence of uncertainty offers a promising direction for both environmental and development policies. For example, cheaper monitoring solutions that facilitate rewards for follow-through outcomes can have positive effects on both take-up and follow-through, as shown in our setting.
References


