Psychology & Economics, Experimental Economics, Game Theory, Mechanism Design
Self-Signaling and Social-Signaling in Giving, 2015, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 117, 26-39.
Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences, 2014, Management Science, 60(11), 2659-2665. [Online Appendix]
The Control Premium: A Preference for Payoff Autonomy with Dave Owens and Ryan Fackler, 2014, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(4), 138-61.
Shifting the Blame to a Powerless Intermediary with Regine Oexl, 2013, Experimental Economics, 16(3), 306-312.
An Unlucky Feeling: Overconfidence and Noisy Feedback with Dave Owens, 2012, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 84(2), 510-524.
On Relations of Invariants for Vector-Valued Bilinear Forms with Thomas Garrity, 2004, Electronic Journal of Linear Algebra, 11, 24-40.
Book Chapters :
Land Assemblage: Efficiency and Equity in Public-Private Projects with Jonathan Pincus and Perry Shapiro, forthcoming, Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. Baker, eds., Edward Elgar.
Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Social Decisions with Joel van der Weele, revise and resubmit, Journal of the European Economic Association.
A Test of Dual-Process Reasoning in Charitable Giving with Joel van der Weele, under review
A Second-Best Mechanism for Land Assembly with Jonathan Pincus and Perry Shapiro, under review.
Silence is Golden: Communication Costs and Team Problem Solving with Gary Charness and David Cooper, under review.
Evaluating the Tradeoff Between Efficiency and Property Rights in Assembly Mechnisms
Summer 2015 courses and office hours:
Econ 100B: T 10-10:45 & R 12:30-1:45
Econ 171: T 12:30-1:45 & R 10-10:45