Announcements:

 

Microeconomics

Economics 210C

(http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~deacon/econ210c.htm)

 

 

Robert Deacon                                                                                               Winter 2008

 

Class:   TTh 11:00-12:15, North Hall 2111

Office hours:   W 2:00-3:30 or by appointment, 3040 North Hall, deacon@econ.ucsb.edu.

 

Teaching Assistant:  Hani Mansour (mansour@econ)

Discussion:  F 2:00-2:50, NH 2111

Office hours: TBA

Exams and Grading: Grades will be based on one midterm exam scheduled for February 7  (35%), a final exam scheduled for March 20, 12:00-3:00pm (50%) and problem sets (15%).

Course content: This course covers the material in Mas-Colell, et al, Microeconomic Theory (1995) Chapters 10-13 and possibly 14, plus a few supplementary readings. The supplementary readings are not intended to introduce new theoretical concepts. Rather, they are included to illustrate how concepts and methods from the text can be adapted to applied problems and to suggest a broader range of questions that can be examined using the approaches developed in class.

Chapter 10, Competitive Markets.
Supplementary reading: Robert T. Deacon and Jon Sonstelie, “Price Controls and Rent Dissipation with Endogenous Transaction Costs,” American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (December 1991) 1361-1373.

Chapter 11, Externalities and Public Goods.
Skip: Depletable Externalities in Sec. 11D; Decentralized Bargaining in Sec. 11E; Example 11.AA.1 in Appendix A.
Supplementary reading: Assar Lindbeck and Jorgen W. Weibull, “Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition,” Public Choice 52 (1987) 273-297.

Midterm Exam (Feb. 7)

Chapter 12, Market Power.
Skip: Example 12.C.2 in Sec. 12C, The Linear City Model of Product Differentiation; Entry and Welfare in Sec. 12.E; Appendix B. In Appendix A we will only cover Nash Reversion and the Nash Reversion Folk Theorem.
Supplementary reading: TBA.

Chapter 13, Adverse Selection, Signaling and Screening.
Skip: ‘Small type’ section on pages 448-450; Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signaling Games, Appendix A.
Supplementary reading: Kelly Bedard, 2001. “Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts.” Journal of Political Economy, 190(4) (2001) 749-775.

Chapter 14, The Principal-Agent Problem.
Skip:TBA.
Supplementary reading: TBA.

 

Final Exam March 20, 12:00-3:00pm