·        HW#2 is due Tues., April 27.

·        HW#3 is now on the problem set link.



Economics 210C




Robert Deacon                                                                                               Spring 2010


Class:   TTh 12:30-1:45, North Hall 2111

Office hours:   Tues. 9:00-11:00 or by appointment, 3040 North Hall (


Teaching Assistant:  Matt Lang (

Discussion:  F 1:00-1:50, NH 2212

Office hours: F 9:00-11:00 , NH2015

Exams and Grading: Grades will be based on:

Midterm exam scheduled for May 4 (35%)

Final exam scheduled for Mon., June 7, 12:00-3:00pm (50%)

problem sets (15%).

Course content: This course covers the material in Mas-Colell, et al, Microeconomic Theory (1995) Chapters 10-13 and possibly 14, plus a few supplementary readings. The supplementary readings are not intended to introduce new theoretical concepts. They are intended for in class discussion, to suggest the range of application for concepts from the assigned material.)

Chapter 10, Competitive Markets.
Supplementary reading: Robert T. Deacon and Jon Sonstelie, “Price Controls and Rent Dissipation with Endogenous Transaction Costs,” American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (December 1991) 1361-1373.

Chapter 11, Externalities and Public Goods.
Skip: Depletable Externalities in Sec. 11D; Decentralized Bargaining in Sec. 11E; Example 11.AA.1 in Appendix A.
Supplementary reading: J. Hirshleifer, “From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods”, Public Choice, 41 (1983) 371-386.

Midterm Exam (May 4) Will try to schedule for 2 hours.

Chapter 12, Market Power
Skip: Example 12.C.2 in Sec. 12C, The Linear City Model of Product Differentiation; Entry and Welfare in Sec. 12.E; Appendix B. In Appendix A we will only cover Nash Reversion and the Nash Reversion Folk Theorem.
Supplementary reading: d’Aspremont, Claude, et al.  On the stability of collusive price leadershipCanadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 16 (1) (1983) 17-25.

Chapter 13, Adverse Selection, Signaling and Screening.
Skip: ‘Small type’ section on pages 448-450; Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signaling Games, Appendix A.
Supplementary reading: Kelly Bedard, 2001. “Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts.” Journal of Political Economy, 190(4) (2001) 749-775.

Chapter 14, The Principal-Agent Problem.
Supplementary reading: TBA.


Final Exam June 7, 12:00-3:00