Who Bears What Risk? An Intergenerational Perspective

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Abstract

Many governments promise pension and medical benefits to their elderly citizens. As the world is aging, the burden of retiree benefits is becoming painfully obvious. Uncertainty about the future makes planning for retiree benefits even more difficult. Who will suffer or gain financially if the future differs from what we expect? We face, for example, tremendous uncertainty about the speed of technical progress, about medical cost, and about trends in fertility and longevity. Government policy determines not only the level of taxes and benefits, but also who bears the risk of unexpected changes.

Traditional retirement programs largely exempt retirees from sharing risk. By making fixed, unconditional promises, they necessarily impose a more than proportional risk on younger cohorts and on future generations. The paper examines the impact of alternative tax, pension, and health care policies on different cohorts. How do existing policies shift risk across cohorts? Are there conditions under which such policies might be appropriate in the interest of general welfare? Is there scope for better policies, and in which direction? The analysis focuses on the United States and covers the main fundamental sources of risk—productivity, fertility, longevity, health, and asset valuation.
Introduction

Governments in most developed countries promise pension and medical benefits to their elderly citizens. As the number of retirees is growing rapidly, the burden of retiree benefits has become painfully obvious. Uncertainty about the future complicates the planning for retiree benefits. If the future is brighter than expected, who will reap the gains? If it’s worse, who will cover the added cost?

The paper examines the impact of uncertainty on different cohorts at an aggregate, macroeconomic level. Macroeconomic analysis helps see different risks and the policies affecting them in context and it enforces consistency, a recognition that society as a whole faces an uncertain future and must bear the resulting financial risks. These risk include a tremendous uncertainty about the future path of technical progress, about medical innovations, and about trends in fertility and longevity—risks so huge that common stock market risks are small in comparison. Tax, pension, and health care policies have a major impact on who bears these risks.

Risk sharing is instructive as a general perspective on public policy because it avoids divisive battles about redistribution. Everyone is better off if risks are shared. Once actual outcomes are observed, however, public policy is inevitably a battle between known winners and known losers, leaving little scope for disinterested economic analysis. Risk sharing is not only a natural perspective looking forward—a search for mutually beneficial insurance arrangements—but equally instructive looking back: To what extent can existing social institutions be explained as solving risk sharing problems? The best perspective is from behind Rawls ‘veil of ignorance.’

Risk should not be defined negatively in this context, but as a symmetric chance of outcomes better or worse than expected. Furthermore, economic risks are often compensated by gains in expectation, creating interesting risk-return tradeoffs. The key challenge for economic policy is therefore not to minimize risks, but to allocate risks to those best able to bear them. If risk taking is rewarded in the market, a related challenge is to maintain incentives for risk-taking and to focus policy interventions into areas where markets fail.
Intergenerational risk sharing is fertile ground for finding market failures because future generations are naturally excluded from insurance markets. Welfare-improvements are possible because a government’s power of taxation gives it a unique ability to make commitments on behalf of future generations. Fiscal institutions such as social security and Medicare formalize such commitments. The government’s power to oblige future generations also creates potential for abuse. Risks might be shifted haphazardly onto future generations by governments catering to current voters. The merits of government intervention are therefore an open question, a question inviting economic analysis.

How does United States fiscal policy the shift risk across cohorts? Has it made the allocation of risk more efficient? Is there scope for better policies, and in which directions? The paper first identifies the key issues and mechanisms of risk sharing and illustrates them with policy examples. Then it systematically examines three sets of major risk factors: macroeconomic risks, focusing on uncertain productivity growth and uncertain asset values; demographic risks due to uncertain fertility and longevity; and medical expense risks due to uncertain health care needs and cost. For each risk factor, the allocations of risk under current and proposed policies are compared to efficient risk sharing and to a laissez-faire allocation.

Aggregate and Generational Risks

The future is rarely as expected. Going through a typical life-cycle, individuals face uncertainty about earnings and job prospects, their health and family status, the return on their savings, and ultimately about the time and manner of their deaths. Some of these risks imply financial burdens that add up across cohorts and over time—driven by macroeconomic disturbances—while other risks wash out.

On a macroeconomic level, uncertainty about earnings and uncertainty about the returns on savings have common underlying sources: uncertainty about technological progress that determines factor productivity and asset values; and uncertainty about demographic developments that determine the supply of labor relative to capital. Demographic uncertainty, in
turn, can attributed to more fundamental shifts in fertility, longevity, and health (disability). Health and mortality can perhaps be traced to even more fundamental factors, e.g., innovations in medical technology.

Tracing risks to their fundamental sources is most easily done at an aggregate level to avoid the confounding effects of idiosyncratic noise. Tracing risks is important for economic and policy analysis because common sources of risk create positive correlations that make risk sharing difficult. Because individuals are exposed to different sources of risk as they age, it is instructive to aggregate risks by cohort or by generation (a collection of cohorts).

Risks that remain significant for an entire generation are essentially macroeconomic. Such risks are more difficult to manage than idiosyncratic risks because they don’t cancel out. Risk sharing is nonetheless promising because different generations are often exposed unequally to the various sources of aggregate risk.

**Managing Aggregate Risks**

There are three main mechanisms for managing aggregate risks—markets, families, and fiscal policy.

Financial markets and insurance markets have serious limitations with regard to aggregate risks. Markets work well for sharing short-term risks between cohorts with largely overlapping lifetimes. But private markets cannot provide insurance if the age difference between cohorts large enough that the older cohorts’ life risks are largely known when the younger cohorts arrive. On aggregate, the insurance industry is owned by the same generation of savers for which the industry provides insurance. Similarly, corporate pension promises are made by firms that are collectively owned by the cohorts that approach retirement. Thus neither insurance policies nor private pensions can provide significant protection against aggregate risks.

The most promising venue for private risk sharing is probably international risk sharing—at least if risks are defined at the national level. International risk sharing has been puzzlingly ineffective, however. Savings have historically flowed mostly into domestic
investment. Investment portfolios are strongly biased towards domestic securities. The analysis below will therefore take mostly a closed-economy perspective, as appropriate in a world with strong home bias.

A second mechanism is intra-family exchange and altruism, as expressed through bequests and inter-vivo gifts. In theory, altruism can fully solve all risk sharing problems, especially if combined with an intra-cohort sharing of idiosyncratic risk. Barro’s (1974) Ricardian neutrality proposition shows that dynastic families behave like a single infinitely lived economic agent, making generational issues moot. Empirically, however, risk sharing within families is highly imperfect, as documented by Altonji et al (1996). While parents’ altruism toward children is undoubtedly important for education issues, the life-cycle model is a good first approximation for individual behavior. Risk-shifting through bequests may nonetheless occur ‘accidentally’ if mortality is uncertain and assets are not annuitized.

The third risk-sharing mechanism is fiscal policy, via social insurance programs, general taxes and transfers, and through the public debt. The most significant programs on the generational level are social security (OASDI) and retiree medical insurance (Medicare, Medicaid). The public debt plays an equivalent role for intergenerational redistribution because it tends to be refinanced repeatedly and passed on to future generation just like pay-as-you-go pensions. Taxes are a general purpose risk sharing device. They socialize the tax share of whatever tax base they are imposed on. Particularly important in the generational context are capital income taxes (broadly construed as all taxes on savings, including individual interest, dividend, and capital gains income, corporate income, and on real property) and consumption taxes.

Fiscal risk sharing is sometimes constrained by tax distortions, specifically by the convexity of excess burden as function of labor income tax rates. Because risk sharing leaves

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1 Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) suggest an even stronger result: With intermarriage between dynasties, not even idiosyncratic risk would an issue, because altruistically motivated transfers from more fortunate to less fortunate family members would eliminate idiosyncratic risk. The Barro and Bernheim-Bagwell papers specifically examine idiosyncratic taxes, but their insights apply equally to family responses to other idiosyncratic shocks.
taxes rates unchanged on average, distortionary taxes per se are not an issue. Also not at issue are capital income taxes. If stochastic capital income is to be taxed for risk-sharing purposes, savings distortions can be avoided by compensating up-front incentives. A convex excess burden does imply a welfare loss if risk sharing calls for variations in labor income tax rates. This is conceptually an enforcement problem inherent in all insurance. After an insured event is either realized or not, one or the other party must be forced to pay up. For intergenerational risk sharing, convexity means that payments are more costly to collect from future generations than they are to disburse. The welfare effect is roughly proportional to the labor supply elasticity and could be minimized by collecting risk-sharing related taxes at times in the life cycles where labor supply elasticities are small. The distortion issue is noted below whenever relevant.

Three Policy Examples
Examples are instructive to illustrate the role of policy and to convey two general points: First, none of the risk sharing mechanisms eliminates the underlying risks. One should be skeptical therefore of policies offering safety to some group without disclosing who is supposed to provide the guarantees. Second, details matter. Risk bearing is often determined by subtle features of economic institutions that are ill-defined or not well understood.

Who ensures that social security is safe? Social security is a good example because its recurrent financial problems are essentially due to its contradictory accounting for risk. Benefits are set according to a fixed formula. Payroll tax rates are supposed to constant. Even if the budget balances initially, the risk profiles of benefits and taxes are inconsistent. Benefits and taxes are bound to drift out of balance if the economy does not grow exactly as expected or if demographic trends don’t exactly match expectations. Honest planning would have to acknowledge that either tax rates or benefits must vary in response to economic and demographic disturbances.
There are two clear-cut and transparent choices: Defined Benefits (DB), which also means variable taxes; and Defined Contributions (DC), which also means variable benefits. DB and DC are instructive points of reference (used below) because more complicated transfer systems are conveniently characterized by how they compare to DB and DC.

For social security, the trust fund complicates the assessment. While the trust fund helps smooth over temporary fluctuations, it cannot solve the deeper problem of uncertainty. The 1983 Greenspan commission apparently thought that the trust fund would fix social security. Even if true in expectation, the fix was bound to fail. Since 1983, the trust fund and the resulting chaos in federal accounting—trust fund accounting conflicting with unified budgeting—have obscured the real questions: Is social security a DB system, or a DC system, or something in between? And what kind of system should it be?

If social security is viewed as defined-benefits system, it is indeed creating safe claims. The counterpart is an unconditional obligation on future generations to finance the promised benefits. To honor this obligation, tax rates will have to rise whenever payrolls grow less than expected, and vice versa. In a DC interpretation, in contrast, social security benefits are contingent claims worth as much as the payroll tax supporting them. Future benefits are bound to differ from what we expect, and they are influenced by a multitude of economic and demographic disturbances. The DB versus DC question is crucial for those who expect to live off social security. When the trust fund runs out, will benefits be cut or will taxes be increased?

Which is the right interpretation? For many decades, the political rhetoric about safe benefits was strongly supportive of the defined-benefits view. Under the Bush administration, however, the Social Security Administration has apparently adopted a DC interpretation, sending out social security statements warning about benefit cuts at the trust fund’s projected exhaustion date. This reinterpretation, if widely accepted, would have a major impact on risk sharing in the United States. It would transform social security from a DB system into an implicit DC system in which retirees carry the risk of future economic and demographic changes. Remarkably, this is happening without much public discussion. On the revenue side, if increases
in payroll taxes are ‘politically impossible,’ then social security has fixed contributions, which would support the DC interpretation. The analysis below will examine both interpretations.

**What are the risk sharing implications of social security reform?** Equity investments within social security illustrate the risk-sharing implications of seemingly minor differences in policy design. To start, consider two basic alternatives: Individual Account carve-outs from social security (say, the 2001 Presidential commission’s proposals) versus the Clinton administration plan, which was to invest part of the trust fund in the stock market while maintaining defined benefits. Carve-outs eliminate risk sharing, just as if social security and all its risk sharing features were scaled down proportionally. Under the Clinton plan, in contrast, equities in the trust fund are effectively owned by future tax payers, so equity risk is shifted across generations. (See Bohn 1999 for details.)

Now consider two slight modifications. First, suppose individual accounts are combined with a minimum-return guarantee. A return guarantee is economically equivalent to a put option on the stock market. A put option is equivalent to a transfer of fractional ownership to the future generations that back the guarantee. (See Smetters 2001 for details.) Individual accounts with guarantees and the Clinton plan have therefore remarkably similar risk sharing implications. The put option argument applies even without explicit guarantees if those earning low returns in individual accounts become eligible for welfare benefits.

Secondly, consider Clinton’s equity investments plan but take a defined-contributions view of social security. In a defined-contributions system, equity gains and losses in the trust fund accrue to the retired generation. The risk-sharing implications are equivalent to non-guaranteed individual accounts—no intergenerational risk shifting. Trust fund investments rule out individual debt-equity choices, of course. Even this microeconomic difference vanishes if individual accounts are restricted to a single index fund.

In summary, the risk sharing implications of equity investment proposals depend on the specifics—so much so that even the promoter’s political affiliation is essentially uninformative.
Individual accounts imply very little effective ownership if accompanied by guarantees or by means-tested supplemental supports. And if trust fund investments are diversified outside the Treasury, their effective ownership depends entirely on the system’s DB versus DC status.

**Who bears the financial risks of Medicare?** Medicare benefits are commonly presented as categorical commitments, just like social security. Hospital Insurance (HI, a.k.a. Medicare Part A) is financed by the same payroll-tax mechanism. Medicare is of separate interest because of two complications, uncertainty about medical expenses and the cost-sharing in Supplemental Medical Insurance (SMI, a.k.a. Medicare Part B & Part D).

If Medicare benefits are defined as a promise to ‘take care of all medical needs,’ the system constitutes a DB plan with highly variable cost, far less predictable than social security. Benefits would be contingent on the uncertain cost of existing treatments and contingent on medical discoveries that may vastly increase beneficiaries perceived need. Both create what I will call medical-expense risk. Cost projections under the DB interpretation are enormous and highly sensitive to alternative assumptions. Hence future generations bear significant risks, to be examined below.

Cost sharing in SMI complicates the assessment. SMI has always required retiree contributions, and there is a history of cost shifting between HI and SMI. To the extent rising HI cost can be shifted to SMI, retirees retain some of the aggregate medical-expense risk. Most SMI is paid from general tax revenues, however, and many retirees have limited income. The same applies to Medicaid. As long as medical care in retirement is viewed as entitlement, medical-expense risk is thus largely carried by future generations.

This allocation of risk would be reversed completely if aggregate expenditures were limited. Kotlikoff and Burns (2004), for example, propose that Medicare be converted into a voucher program subsidizing individual insurance purchases. Kotlikoff and Burns suggest somewhat misleadingly that vouchers provide full insurance, e.g., they dwell on how vouchers can be sensitive to pre-existing conditions. But their key assumption is that the growth of
vouchers is limited to the growth rate of wages. Whenever aggregate medical expenses rise faster than wages, vouchers would cover a declining share of each retiree’s expenses. A capped voucher system therefore places the aggregate medical-expense risk onto the retiree generation.

The three examples illustrate how program rules determine the allocation of risk. All exhibit the no-free-lunch principle: With proper accounting, governments cannot make a macroeconomic risk factor vanish. The risk is just reallocated. The multitude of choices leads to the next question: How should society allocate aggregate risks?

**A Benchmark: Equal Risk Sharing**

A natural benchmark for risk sharing is the proportionate pooling of risk. Everyone bears the impact of any conceivable good or bad economic outcome in proportion to the person’s normal consumption opportunities. Risk pooling is the unique efficient allocation if everyone has the same relative risk aversion. If risks were allocated differently, individuals with above-average risk exposure would be willing to pay a higher price for risk-reduction than individuals with below-average exposure. Unequal risks exposures are therefore indicators of economic inefficiency.

Risk pooling provides a clear guideline for policy and a roadmap for economic analysis. To improve welfare, policy should shift risks from cohorts more exposed to a given source of risk to those initially less exposed. To find policy improvements, one must assess who bears how much of each risk in the market, how the risks would be allocated with efficient sharing, and then compare the market allocation with the efficient allocation.

Two clarifications and two caveats are in order. First, risk bearing and risk sharing are about consumption—or more precisely, the marginal utility thereof—and not about incomes. Because labor supply and savings opportunities differ across cohorts, consumption pooling usually entails unequal exposures to income risk. Second, risks can be shared with future generations by variations in capital accumulation. Most economic disturbances therefore trigger consumption responses in current and future periods. Efficiency requires that retiree
consumption and working-age consumption respond equally in every period, usually with declining amplitude over time.

The first caveat is to emphasize that aggregate risks have a market price. In finance terms, aggregate risks are systematic risks. On financial markets, securities with systematic risk trade at a discount to safe assets, or equivalently, they promise an expected return above the safe interest rate. The same principle applies to aggregate risks that are reallocated through fiscal policy and may be non-tradable. To make everyone better off, a policy must offer compensation to those required to bear more risk—a risk premium. The acid test for a welfare-improving policy is that those relieved of risks are better off after paying the risk premium. Economic theory has unfortunately trouble explaining empirically observed risk premiums, notably the equity premium. While risk pooling provides an straightforward benchmark for how risk should be allocated, the magnitude of the compensation is sometimes difficult to determine.

The second caveat is that risk exposures must be adjusted if individuals differ in their intrinsic risk aversion. Less risk averse individuals demand a lower price for bearing risk and should bear more risk in an efficient allocation. The literature on habit formation suggests that older people, the retiree cohort, may be more risk averse that younger, working-age individuals. I will insert this caveat below, as needed.

Efficient risk sharing has in any case implications that are robust to differential risk aversion. Most importantly, everyone should be exposed to aggregate risk in the same direction. If a disturbance hits only working-age cohorts, or only retirees, or both generations in opposite directions, risk sharing is always inefficient. Moreover, if one cohort is more risk-averse than another, it should be proportionately less exposed to all types of risk, yielding testable restrictions in a world with many sources of risk.

A Tractable Analytic Framework
The risk pooling principle has most power if applied across multiple risks. It lends itself to systematic analysis. Because examining and aggregating the joint effects of all the various risks
on different cohorts is not an easy task, it is instructive to take a stylized perspective on work and on asset accumulation over the life-cycle. The classic Diamond (1965) two-period overlapping-generations (OG) model provides a convenient framework.

In the Diamond model, all cohorts in the workforce are lumped together into a single working-age generation. All retired cohorts are treated as a single retiree generation. Children are attached to their parents household. Changes in longevity can be modeled as changes in the relative length of working-age and retirement. This description of the life cycle is clearly simplified, but that’s the point. It helps understand and highly key elements of intergenerational risk sharing without getting lost in the multitude and minutiae of differences in how individuals lead their lives.

Incomes in working-age are primarily wage incomes. Wage incomes after taxes are divided between consumption and savings. Savings are invested in financial markets. They end up financing either domestic capital accumulation, or government bonds, or investments abroad. Incomes in the retiree generation are from capital and other assets. Retirees use asset income, asset sales, and transfers from the government to finance retirement consumption, medical care, and (perhaps) bequests.2

What can this framework tell us about who bears what risks? The following sections will examine each of the major risks.

**Aggregate Risks (I): Macroeconomic Risks**

**Uncertain Productivity Growth.** Productivity growth is quantitatively the most important source of long-run economic uncertainty. With one percent annual productivity growth for a generation, for example, our children will earn 35 percent higher incomes (compounding one percent for 30 years), and our grandchildren 80 percent more. With three percent annual growth...

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2 The model abstracts from overlap between work status and income types. Much of the capital income during working-age accrues in retirement funds or as housing wealth that is rarely liquidated before retirement. The economics of retirement savings is therefore not much distorted if one pretends that the return on working-age savings accrues at the time of retirement.
productivity growth, our children would instead earn 140 percent more and our grandchildren almost 500 percent more. Without productivity growth, per-capita incomes would stagnate. The zero to three percent range falls well within the range growth rates experienced around the world.

Who bears the risk of such growth uncertainty? Because labor and capital shares in national income are essentially constant, growth uncertainty has an equal impact on wages earned by working-age households and on capital incomes earned by retirees. Equal income effects do not imply equal consumption effects, however. There are three main differences.

First, the retiree generation owns not only the earnings but also the principal value of accumulated real and financial assets. Because asset values are less sensitive to growth than earnings (see below), existing assets reduce retiree generation’s exposure to productivity risk, leaving workers relatively more exposed.

Second, government transfers and taxes augment retiree incomes at the expense of working cohorts’ incomes. Because net transfers tend to be less sensitive to growth than wages and capital incomes, fiscal policy further reduces retiree exposure to productivity risk while increasing working cohorts’ exposure.

Third, the working-age generation may respond to unexpectedly high or low productivity by altering its saving rate and its work hours. The study of labor supply and savings responses is unfortunately complicated because several income and substitution effects interact. This is examined in more detail in Bohn (2004), where I conclude that savings and labor supply responses tend to further magnify the impact of productivity shock on working-age consumption.

For readers interested in the mechanisms (others may skip this paragraph): The key distinctions are between income and productivity shocks and between temporary and permanent shocks. Negative income shocks can be absorbed by working more. Negative productivity shocks reduce not only income but also the hourly wage, which makes a productivity slump an inefficient time to work more. A variable labor supply therefore does not enable working cohorts to bear more productivity risk. The permanence of shocks matters because the young can absorb
temporary shocks by consumption-smoothing over their life-cycle. A change in productivity growth is, however, a permanent disturbance to the economy’s productivity level, which rules out consumption-smoothing. The permanence of shocks also matters because high future productivity raises interest rates, which has income and substitution effects. Assuming a low elasticity of substitution (consistent with empirically estimates), high productivity growth reduces the savings rate and therefore magnifies the impact of productivity shocks on working-age consumption.

Overall, the overlapping-generations model yields an unambiguous conclusion: Working-age individuals are more exposed to productivity risk than retirees. This result may seem to conflict with the notion that capital incomes are more risky than wage incomes. There is no conflict, however, if one properly distinguishes productivity risk from asset valuation risk—to be examined next.

**Uncertain Asset Values.** Returns to capital are subject to a second source of risk, the uncertainty about the price at which seasoned capital can be sold to the next generation. This includes the much-discussed stock market and housing market risks. Because asset valuation risk falls primarily on the retiree generation, retiree incomes can be more volatile than working-age incomes.

The main social mechanisms for sharing valuation risk are capital income taxation and bequests. Capital income taxes yield return-contingent government receipts that reduce the need for taxes on future generations. This gives future generations an exposure to the current return on capital. Income taxes unfortunately reduce savings incentives. One policy response has been to provide savings incentives up-front and fully tax the returns, as exemplified by 401k, 403b, etc. plans and regular IRAs. Another policy response has been to tax capital gains and dividends at reduced rate, or to exempt capital income entirely, e.g. in Roth IRAs. The distinction is

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3 A temporary productivity shock would require a period of high growth to be followed by an offsetting period of low growth—a somewhat implausible scenario. Even then, consumption smoothing is insufficient under plausible assumptions to correct the overexposure of working-age cohorts to productivity risk; see Bohn (2004) for details.
important because risks are shared in proportion to the marginal tax rate. A tax system with
taxed returns and up-front incentives provides much more risk sharing than tax-exempt savings.  
The other important mechanism is bequests. For risk sharing purposes, bequests are equivalent to 
a self-imposed capital income tax that benefits future generations.

**Evidence on Productivity and Valuation Risks.** Empirical evidence is consistent with wage 
income being relatively more exposed to productivity risk than capital income. In Bohn (2004), I 
compute 30-year-ahead ‘generational’ covariance matrices from annual 1875-2002 United States 
GDP data and S&P500 prices and dividends. In the preferred error-corrections specification that 
exploits the stationarity of the dividend yield and the dividends/GDP ratio, I find a generational 
standard deviation for GDP of \( \sigma_Y = 35 \) percent, a 64 percent standard deviation for equity 
returns, and a 41 percent correlation between the 30-year-ahead forecast errors.

If one interprets the data in terms of Cobb-Douglas production, the standard deviations of 
wages and productivity equal the standard deviation of GDP. If capital is financed with equity 
and debt (about 26 percent debt) and debt is essentially safe, standard deviation of capital (\( R^k \)) is 
\( \sigma_{R^k} = (1 - 0.26) \times 0.64 = 47 \) percent. One may also decompose the return on capital into a GDP-
factor plus an orthogonal asset valuation factor (\( V \)), \( R^k = \pi \cdot Y + V \). The above estimates imply a 
factor loading of \( \hat{\pi} = \text{cov}(Y, R^k) / \text{var}(Y) = 0.58 \) and \( \sigma_V = \sqrt{\sigma_{R^k}^2 - \hat{\pi}^2 \sigma_Y^2} = 43 \) percent.

Even my long data set covers only a small number of non-overlapping generational 
periods. The generational variances and covariances are therefore best viewed as point estimates 
subject to substantial specification uncertainty.  
It is reassuring nonetheless how well the 
estimates match economic theory. Notably:

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4 Readers with finance background may question this argument because up-front incentives imply a 
proportionally higher account balance at the individual level. If invested entirely in equities, this implies the same 
risk-exposure as an investment in an account without up-front incentives but tax-exempt earnings. The equivalence 
is invalid at the aggregate level, however, because up-front exemptions must be financed. Ceteris paribus, they 
imply a greater share of government debt in capital markets and hence in the average retiree’s (enlarged) portfolio. 
On aggregate, savers must hold the capital stock and therefore cannot hold more equities in a system with up-front 
incentives than in a system with after-tax savings.

5 It is an open question to what extent estimates for the S&P500 generalize to other financial assets used for 
retirement savings. One may suspect that diversification into other asset classes would yield a lower valuation risk. 
The results for the S&P500 provide at least a starting point for thinking about long-run risks.
(1) The factor loading below one indicates that capital returns are less exposed to productivity risk than output and wages—about 58 percent as much.

(2) The inequality $\sigma_{R^k} > \sigma_Y$ confirms the conventional wisdom that returns on capital investment are more volatile than wages.

Note that the estimates are also consistent with productivity uncertainty as the dominant source of consumption risk at long horizons, especially looking several generations ahead. This is because future generations bear valuation risk for a limited number of years, between work and retirement, whereas their exposure to productivity risk grows with the forecast horizon.

The differences in riskiness between retiree and working-age incomes are promising for intergenerational risk sharing. They suggest that working-age cohorts benefit from shifting productivity risk to retirees, while retirees benefit from shifting asset pricing risks to subsequent generations.

**Linking Income to Consumption: A Quantitative Analysis.** Quantitative insights about the efficiency of risk sharing can be obtained by combining the data with a calibrated version of the overlapping-generations model.

Table 1 shows how differential income risks translate into unequal consumption exposures. The calibration builds on Bohn (2001, 2004). Each columns present the risk sharing implications of a different policy scenario. Entries in Panel A show percentage responses in both generations consumption, in working-age income, and in capital investment to an unexpected 35 percent increase in productivity growth. The 35 percent change can be interpreted as generational standard deviation or as 1 percent per year compounded for 30 years. Panel B shows responses to an unexpected 40 percent increase in asset values, also about a standard deviation.

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6 The main macroeconomic assumptions are a 30 percent capital share in production, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.5, a 25 percent share of old capital in the total return on retirement savings, an inelastic labor supply, a trend path with 1 percent annual population growth, 1.5 percent annual productivity growth, a 4.5 percent real return on capital, and a length of the retirement equal to one-third of work-life (15:45 years).
The responses are symmetric and scalable. Negative disturbances would have the reverse effects, smaller or greater shocks would have proportionally smaller or greater impact. The percentage values can therefore be interpreted as exposures to risk. They can be used contemporaneously to assess the efficiency of risk sharing between current retirees and current workers, or prospectively to examine risk sharing between future retirees (current workers) and future workers (current children and unborn).

Table 1 about here

Column 1 shows the allocation of risk in a laissez-faire economy without bequests. Higher productivity raises working-age consumption, incomes, and capital investment by about as much as productivity (35 percent), but retirement consumption by substantially less (26 percent). Unexpectedly high asset values affect only retirees. Column 2 adds bequests to the laissez-faire economy, specifically that 20 percent of retiree resources are bequeathed to working-age cohorts. Retirees remain exposed to the same risks as before, but working-age cohorts bear a little valuation risk. The more diversified income slightly reduces working-age exposure to productivity risk.

Column 3 shows the allocation one would obtain with perfectly pooled risk. Retiree and working-age consumption would respond equally to both shocks. Because savings respond more to productivity shocks than working-age consumption, disposable income in working age should be less sensitive to productivity shocks than retiree income. The efficient allocation of valuation risk cuts retirees exposure by more than two-thirds, and it shares valuation risk with future generations through substantial variations in investment.

Column 4 adds a stylized representation of United States fiscal institutions to the market economy with bequests. The retiree generation receives partially wage-indexed, annuitized social security benefits: five percent of GDP on average, 50 percent wage-indexed to proxy indexation to age 60. They receive medical benefits that are unresponsive to productivity risk, 3.5 percent of GDP. 

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7 To be specific, bequests are modeled as ‘accidental’ due to stochastic mortality and imperfect annuitization. The latter is discussed below in the section on longevity risk.
GDP. They pay income and consumption taxes, 3.5 percent of GDP with 15 percent marginal rate; and they hold safe government bonds, 2.5 percent of generational GDP. The relative magnitudes of transfers and taxes match Kotlikoff et. al’s (1999) generational accounts for age 65, rounded for simplicity.

If one compares the calibrated policy (Col.4) with laissez faire (Col.2) and with the efficient allocation (Col.3) one finds: Fiscal policy magnifies the generational gap between working-age and retiree exposure to productivity risk. This is largely because public debt, medical benefits, and social security (the non-wage-indexed part) provide safe claims to retirees. While safe transfers reduces retiree exposure to risk, they force the government to collect fixed revenues from the next generation’s stochastic wage income. This increases the relative risk exposure of working-age cohorts. Policy also shifts valuation risk from retirees to workers, largely because of the capital income tax, but not as much as risk pooling would require.

Columns 5-6 illustrate the impact of alternative policies. Column 5 assumes fully wage-indexed transfers, a 30 percent (doubled) tax on capital income, holding savings incentives and the generational account constant through compensating transfers. Column 6 assumes that all retiree transfers are fixed in real terms. The allocation with wage-indexing and higher marginal tax rates is evidently closer to risk pooling than current policy, whereas fixed benefits yield a more uneven allocation of productivity risk.

Overall, Table 1 demonstrates how fiscal policy influences risk sharing and how it could improve the allocation of risk. Note that a better sharing of productivity risk would make labor income taxes less variable and therefore reduce the excess burden of taxation. Hence tax distortions cannot explain the imperfect sharing of productivity risk. They may play a role in why valuation risk is not fully shared.

The public policy debate seems incoherent with regard to how much risk retirees should take. Two popular positions are (a) to encourage equity investments and (b) to provide safe claims. Both positions are inconsistent with risk pooling. To justify (a), one would have to consider retirees highly risk-tolerant. But then retirees should bear a lot more productivity risk,
contradicting (b). To justify (b), one would have to view retirees as intrinsically more risk-averse than younger individuals. This might justify fiscal institutions that provide safe income to retirees, but it would argue strongly against pushing retirees into equity investments. The inconsistent positions are exemplified by the 2001 Social Security Reform Commission’s “Model 2,” which combines equity investments in private accounts with a move from wage- to price-indexed traditional benefits.

If retirees are about as risk averse as younger cohorts, welfare improvements can be found in the direction of more wage- or GDP-indexing, either within social security or via GDP-indexed public debt. (See Bohn 1990, Shiller 1993, Borensztein et al. 2005, for more discussion of GDP-indexing.) Not all indexing is beneficial, however. For example, if productivity shocks are negatively correlated with inflation, as evidence suggests, inflation-indexed government debt yields less risk sharing than traditional nominal debt. Because stochastic inflation would create new risks, the point of this caveat is more to distinguish wage- and GDP-indexing from inflation-indexing than an argument for nominal debt.

**Aggregate Risks (II): Demographics**

**Uncertain Fertility.** Changes in fertility have major effects on the economy and on intergenerational transfers. The baby-boom and baby-bust phenomena are prime examples. The public pensions debate has unfortunately mischaracterized this phenomenon by focusing on the fiscal burden that falls more heavily on smaller cohorts than on larger ones.

Macroeconomic theory suggests that being born into a small cohort is actually good news. When a small cohort enters the labor force, workers are scarce and retirement savings from the preceding larger cohorts provide a high capital-labor ratio. When small cohorts move towards retirement, subsequent larger cohorts provides the labor that allows retirement savings to earn a high return. In a world without pay-as-you-go transfers, risk sharing would therefore call for net transfers from small cohorts to larger ones. In a world with pay-as-you-go transfers, higher payroll taxes on smaller cohorts can be interpreted as risk sharing—not as a fiscal problem, but as solution to a demographic risk sharing problem.
Table 2A provides a quantitative assessment of who bears the risk of variable cohort sizes. The table displays responses to an unexpected 15 percent decline in the labor force (about the decline between the baby boom and baby bust: 79 million births 1945-64 versus 69 million births 1965-84). Col.1-6 display the allocation of risk for the same scenarios as in Table 1, with the clarification that transfers are defined benefit in Col.4-5 but defined contributions in Col.6. The laissez-faire allocations illustrate the benefits of being in a small cohort (Col.1-2). The consumption of the retired ‘baby boom’ generation declines whereas the income and consumption of the working-age ‘baby bust’ generation rise. Efficient risk sharing calls for a slight increase in both generations’ consumption (Col.3), as permitted by a slight increase in per-capita income. The calibrated United States policy (Col.4) yields consumption responses in the same opposing directions as laissez-faire. The smaller absolute values indicate better risk sharing. The policy alternative with more defined benefit transfers (Col.5) provides more risk pooling than the calibrated policy, whereas the defined-contributions system (Col.6) provides virtually no risk sharing. In summary, defined-benefit transfers help share demographic risk.

Table 2 about here

Empirical evidence on the effects of demographic risk is unfortunately scarce. Evidence exists on the labor market, where the wage effects of a variable cohort size are well documented (e.g., Welch 1979). Capital market effects are difficult to document, perhaps because the start of retirement savings is more variable cross-sectionally than a cohort’s entry into the labor force. Capital market effects are also obscured by high asset price volatility and perhaps by international capital flows. Population aging is a world-wide phenomenon, however, so the scope for international diversification is limited. Despite the scarcity of evidence, economic theory is probably a better guide to the future than naive trend extrapolations that assume a disconnect between demographic change and factor prices.

8 Note that variable immigration would have the same impact on cohort size as a variable fertility. The macroeconomic implications would identical. My interpretation focuses on fertility mainly to avoid questions about who’s preferences count for the welfare analysis.
Uncertain Longevity. Mortality has long been on a declining trend. The main intergenerational impact is on life-expectancy in retirement—longevity for short. Increased longevity is obviously good news for the retirees. But unless all retirement income is annuitized, increased longevity has a negative impact on living standards. It requires a reduced rate of per-period consumption.

Efficient risk sharing calls for a sharing of longevity risk with subsequent generations. On a microeconomic level, annuities are the obvious risk sharing tool, but they are subject to adverse selection and often unavailable. Most assets are held in non-annuitized form, which leads to substantial intergenerational transfers through accidental bequests. On an aggregate level, longevity risk is virtually impossible to insure in the market. Insurance providers would be owned collectively by the generation that seeks insurance. Insurance between nearby, but distinct cohorts would have to be signed far in advance, before too much about actual longevity is known. The government has therefore a unique role as a provider of longevity insurance backed by future generations, providing a rationale for annuitized public pensions.

The degree of inefficiency without public pensions depends heavily on retiree attitudes toward bequests. To the extent assets are bequeathed intentionally—say, to a close relative or to a favorite charity—there is no inefficiency. To the extent bequests occur because annuities are unavailable, public pensions improve retiree welfare. For examining intergenerational risk sharing, I interpret the popularity of public pensions as indication that most retirees like annuities, i.e., do not have altruistic bequest motives strong enough to make the risk sharing problem moot.

Not all annuitized public pensions share aggregate longevity risk. The key design issue is if per-period pensions and related medical benefits are fixed regardless of longevity—defined benefits—or if payroll taxes and other contributions are held constant—defined contributions. In the defined-benefits case, increased longevity requires higher taxes. In the defined-contributions case, increased aggregate longevity must lead to reduced per-period benefit payments.
Table 2B provides a quantitative perspective on how fiscal policy allocates longevity risk. The table shows responses to a permanent 15 percent increase in longevity during retirement (about 2 years). Under laissez-faire, per-period retiree consumption declines one-for-one with longevity (see Col.1-2). Because working-age cohorts also expect a longer retirement, they increase savings and reduce consumption, but only fractionally. Efficient risk sharing simply calls for sharing current resources (see Col.3). Savings remain unchanged because the longevity increase is permanent and leaves no scope for risk sharing over time. The calibrated allocation in Col.4 shares longevity risk better than laissez-faire, due to annuitized social security and health benefits, but not completely. The expanded transfer system in Col.5 comes closer to risk pooling, documenting the risk sharing role of annuitized defined benefits, whereas the defined-contribution system in Col.6 is as inefficient as laissez-faire.

The retirement age is an open question in this context. One may of course allow early retirement at an actuarially reduced pension. The deeper question is how the normal retirement age should relate to longevity. Medical improvements that extend a generation’s ability to work may be viewed as a positive demographic shock. Risk sharing would then suggest that individuals capable of working longer should indeed work longer and share the gains with other cohorts. The gains may be small, however, because if retirement ages are individually optimal, working longer increases lifetime income by about as much as it reduces utility from leisure, leaving no first-order gains for sharing.

A related issue is the baseline for insurance. Only unexpected changes are insurable. If one started with naïve static expectations, any increase in longevity would trigger payments from those living short lives to those who have the financial misfortune of living longer. Insurance against good news—living longer—is counterintuitive from a distributional perspective. If insurance is conditioned on a positive trend path for longevity, in contrast, only deviations from this path are insurable and would trigger increased or reduced intergenerational transfers.

Conditioning on the trend is perhaps the best argument for linking retirement age to longevity. It seems unfair to let generations who die early pay for the predictably-higher
expenses of longer-living generations. But to avoid slipping from defined benefits to defined contributions, the normal retirement age needs to be fixed well before a cohort approaches retirement. An exemplary implementation is the increase in retirement age from 65 to 67 in the United States, which was announced decades in advance.

Finally, note that tax distortions may impose limits on sharing demographic risks. Fertility and longevity risk are shared by imposing higher working-age taxes on unexpectedly small cohorts and on cohorts that follow unusually long-lived ones. It is an open question to what extent tax distortions explain why demographic risk sharing is incomplete in practice. Distortions do provide another rationale for link normal retirement age to the longevity trend.

Aggregate Risks (III): Health Care
The growth in medical expenses has reached a stage where health care deserves treatment as a macroeconomic risk factor. The social security debate has been remarkably silent about health issues, even though Medicare and Medicaid are growing much more rapidly and—looking forward—impose the greater fiscal burden. It is tempting to avoid the issue because health care raises touchy questions about preferences over life, death, and human suffering. I will nonetheless attempt a welfare-theoretic analysis—we cannot afford to ignore the issue.

Two very different perspectives are influential in the health care debate. One view is that every person is entitled to health and survival, regardless of wealth or income. Under this view, public spending on health care is inelastic and growing at an exogenous rate, driven by an ethical obligation to pay for all health care that is technically feasible. The economic implications are troubling. Scary fiscal projections such as Gokhale and Smetters’ (2003) $38 trillion present value estimate for Medicare must be taken seriously. Cost uncertainty creates a huge need for insurance.

The other view is that people buy health care like other commodities and that the resulting demand for health services responds elastically to changing relative prices and to rising income. Growth in medical spending is then endogenous, driven in part by technological
innovations that reduce quality-adjusted prices, in part by rising incomes, and in part by inefficient insurance arrangements that provide false price signals. Insuring expenditures would then be misguided. The insurable events are instead the discoveries of new treatments and the resulting changes in relative prices. The need for insurance depends on health consumers’ price elasticity. If innovations reduce the price of curing a health problem, expenditures fall if demand is inelastic, stay constant if demand has unit elasticity, or rise if demand is elastic. In practice, new treatments tend to increase overall medical spending, suggesting that demand is more than unit-elastic. Setting aside the well-known static inefficiencies of third-party insurance (a topic best left to microeconomics), the key macro implication is that rapid growth in medical spending may well be an efficient response to medical innovations and price-elastic demand.

The two contrasting views have some common macroeconomic and intergenerational implications. Medical expenses are bound to increase as share of GDP, either unavoidably (view 1) or because it’s optimal (view 2). The generational implications follow from the correlation between age and medical needs: Risk sharing—of whatever type is appropriate—will go in the direction of working-age cohorts providing insurance to retirees.

The source of rising medical expenses is important for the distributional baseline. Even if one takes an entitlement view of what society should cover, one must acknowledge that growth in medical expenses is largely driven by new treatments. Intergenerational insurance against health care cost is thus analogous to longevity insurance. Just like longevity insurance, insurance against medical expenses insures against the financial implications of good news—the discovery of new treatments. Just like longevity insurance, such insurance is awkward from a distributional perspective. Why should we be responsible for the medical expenses of future generations who we expect to be more healthy, more wealthy, and longer living than we are? The fiscal balance rule of generational accounting appears questionable in this context because it obliges current generations to share the cost of treatments not yet invented (e.g., within Gokhale-Smetters $38 trillion estimate).
Intergenerational risk sharing is again about the impact of changes relative to a given baseline, and it is applicable regardless of baseline. For the economic analysis, I divide health care into two conceptually distinct types, roughly corresponding to the two views. Type 1 consists of life-saving or life-lengthening treatments that are a prerequisite for normal life (life-saving care, for short). Type 2 consists of items that make people feel better, discretionary care for short. In the overlapping-generations model, one may think of life-saving care as affecting the probability of reaching a certain age, but not utility from consumption conditional on survival, whereas type-2 health care enters into each period’s utility function.

Risk sharing with type-1 medical expenses is centrally about the value of life, an issue where normative answers are outside the scope of economics. If, however, one takes a certain level of life-saving care as given and if such care enters separably into individual preferences, efficient risk sharing calls for the unexpected cost to be shared. The usual principles of risk sharing apply to the generations’ non-medical consumption.

Efficient risk sharing with type-2 medical expenses is a straightforward exercise in welfare analysis. Health care prices enter the price index for consumption. Assuming discretionary care has a higher weight in retiree consumption, an unexpected decline in quality-adjusted medical prices implies a decline in the price index of retiree consumption relative to the price index of working-age consumption. If the elasticity of substitution between health care and other consumption is above one—as presumed in the discretionary view—efficient risk sharing calls for retirees to share the welfare-gains from lower medical prices with working-age cohorts. Real consumption would increase for all cohorts, but consumption spending would decline for retirees while rising for working-age cohorts.

Table 3 provides a quantitative illustration. The setting is the Diamond model described above, now with a distinction between medical and non-medical consumption. Retirees are assumed to have twice as much health care needs as working-age cohorts. The factor two is conservative, to avoid overstating the differences. The ratio was 2.67 in 1999 for public and private health care expenses and about 5.7 for government-funded care. The overall value is relevant for welfare
two extreme scenarios, “Full Coverage” of retiree medical expenses (defined benefits) versus “Capped Benefits” (fixed contributions). Efficient risk sharing is shown in Col.3. Consumption spending refers to total consumption, including private and government-provided health care, with non-medical consumption as numeraire. For reference, public spending in the United States covers about 65 percent of retiree health care. With Medicare drug coverage about to start, this percentage is likely to increase.

*Table 3 about here*

Panel A explores the implication of a permanent 30 percent increase in medical needs, meaning an increase in expenses that is unavoidable and separable in preferences from other consumption. The Full Coverage scenario imposes the cost entirely on the next generation of taxpayers, leaving non-medical retiree consumption unchanged. The Capped Benefits scenario holds overall retiree spending unchanged, forcing them to fund the incremental medical expenses from reduced non-medical spending. Working-age households also face increased medical expenses, but their response is mainly driven by their expectations about retirement. In the Full Coverage scenario, savings and investment decline as workers pay higher taxes to fund retiree medical expenses without having to worry about increased own expenses in retirement. In the Capped Benefits scenario, working-age savings and investment increase in expectation of higher medical expenses in retirement.

The standard for efficient risk sharing with separable preferences is an equal response of non-medical spending. In the setting of Table 3A, this implies a 27 percent coverage of cost (see Col.3), forcing retiree and worker non-medical consumption to decline. Efficiency also implies a zero savings response because expenses increase equally in current and future periods. The 27

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10 This percentage is about half-way between the Social Security Administration’s intermediate cost and high-cost estimates for Hospital Insurance in 2035. It may be interpreted as standard deviation if one views the high and low cost estimates as 2-sigma confidence bands.
percent value is sensitive to the example parameters. The zero investment response is robust, a hallmark of an efficient response to a permanent shock.

Table 3B presents a setting where individuals have preferences with constant elasticity of substitution over real medical and non-medical consumption. Prices are assumed to decline by 30 percent, the elasticity equals two, so medical expenses also increase by 30 percent. But now the increased spending reflects a relative price chance favorable to retirees. Full Coverage (Col.1) raise retiree consumption, reduces working-age consumption, and reduces capital investment as savers expect full health coverage in retirement. Capped Benefits (Col.2) leaves retiree spending unchanged and triggers an individually-optimal shift from non-medical to health care consumption. Workers also shift away from non-medical to health care consumption, and they reduce savings slightly because lower-cost health care yields greater benefits in retirement than during working-age.

Efficient risk sharing (Col.3) now calls for retirees to share the positive effect of lower health care prices with working-age cohorts by accepting reduced transfers. Retirement spending declines, non-medical consumption declines even more, whereas working-age income and consumption spending rise. The numerical values are again example-specific, but the efficiency of a benefit reduction and the zero investment response are robust. These results apply to any permanent price decline provided permanent retirees consume relatively more health care than younger cohorts.

**International Risks: Wars and Foreign assets**

Wars. The risk of war is a major risk omitted in the analysis above. This is because burden sharing is the standard paradigm of war financing, so risk sharing does not provide much new insight. War expenses and war-related damages are negative shocks to the national resource constraint. A draft could be interpreted as negative but temporary shock to working age productivity. In an overlapping generations setting, efficiency would call for risk-pooling across
generations. The results of a formal analysis would presumably resemble Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing model.

The overlapping generations model gives, however, different answers than the representative agent literature solving Ramsey tax problems. In representative agent models, the risk of war is best shared instantaneously through state contingent claims (Lucas and Stokey 1983). In the overlapping-generations model, efficient risk sharing includes future generations. Their contributions to war finance cannot be collected instantaneously and requires taxation over time. State-contingent debt therefore does not avoid the need for a dynamic fiscal response to wars and other temporary shocks.

**Foreign Assets.** Foreign assets are the focus of international risk sharing. Most relevant for fiscal policy is Shiller’s (1993, 1999) work. Shiller (1999) views international and intergenerational risk sharing as alternative insurance mechanisms. His (1993) book explains in some detail how international financial markets would help share income risks. In the same spirit, one could imagine macro markets for country-specific fertility risks, longevity risks, and health care risks.

Unfortunately, Shiller’s macro markets do not yet exist. Existing financial markets facilitate capital flows and they permit the trading of claims against capital income. For a quantitative perspective, note that the United States capital stock is about 225 percent of GDP, net foreign liabilities are about 25 percent of GDP, direct investments and equity holdings abroad are 36 percent of GDP and foreign direct and equity investment in the United States are 43 percent of GDP (all for 2003). Domestic residents thus retain a 190 GDP-percent exposure to domestic asset valuation risk (=226-36), almost equal to their 200 GDP-percent net wealth (=225-25).

The main deviations from a closed economy are the higher capital stock, which presumably raises the marginal product of labor, and the largely debt-financed claims against foreign capital. Uncertainty about the return on foreign assets is another source of risk that might
be shared across generations. A rigorous analysis would have to treat foreign claims as endogenous, however, which is beyond the scope of this paper. The low ratio of foreign assets to net worth (43/200) suggests that international assets are a smaller source of risk than any of the aggregate risks discussed above. It is still unclear why international risk sharing is so incomplete; for now, a closed economy perspective on risk sharing is not unreasonable.

**Endogenous Growth**

A promising area for future research is intergenerational risk sharing in an endogenous growth context. The literature has routinely assumed exogenous growth—my work included. Intergenerational risk sharing has potentially much greater welfare benefits if it has affects economic growth, e.g., along the lines of Obstfeld’s (1994) work on international risk sharing. In Obstfeld’s model, individuals choose between low-risk low-return and higher-risk high-return technologies. Under autarchy, risk-averse individuals choose relatively low-return investments. When risk are shared and thus reduced, individuals choose higher-return investments, leading to an increase in the average rate of growth. Applied to generations, the same argument suggests that better intergenerational risk sharing may encourage savers to select higher-risk higher-return technologies, which would lead to an increase in average growth rates. The Obstfeld model suggests that growth effects could magnify the gains from risk sharing by an order of magnitude.

**Conclusions**

The paper has examined the allocation of major aggregate risks from an intergenerational perspective. Aggregate risks cannot be eliminated by insurance but they can be managed through risk sharing. Government has a key role because it can oblige future generations to participate in risk sharing arrangements. Many fiscal institutions and practices can be interpreted as risk sharing arrangements in this sense, while others seem counterproductive. Intergenerational risk sharing is far from perfect.
More specifically, the paper studies risks related to productivity growth and to asset prices, demographic risks due to changes in fertility and longevity, and medical-expense risks created by changing health care needs and by innovations in medical technology.

With regard to macroeconomic risks, the paper’s message is to focus on productivity growth and not be distracted by uncertain asset values. Though uncertain asset values are indeed a risk for retirement savers and other asset holders, productivity growth is a much greater source of long run uncertainty. United States fiscal institutions are well suited to provide safe claims to retirees—via social security and government bonds—and asset valuation risk is shared via income taxes. Growth uncertainty has received comparatively little attention. Compared to a benchmark allocation with perfect risk pooling, the retiree generation appears underexposed to productivity risk, though still overexposed to asset valuation risk.

With regard to baby-boom and baby-bust phenomena, the key insight is that defined-benefit pensions and other intergenerational transfers have an important risk sharing function. In an economy without such transfers, large cohorts are worse off than small cohorts. A large cohort’s labor supply tend to depress wages and its supply of retirement savings tends to depress asset returns. Defined-benefit pensions impose relatively lighter burdens on larger cohorts and thereby help share demographic risk.

Fiscal policy has a similar risk sharing role with regard to longevity. Longevity insurance is awkward from a distributional perspective, however. To share the financial risk of longevity, cohorts suffering from low life expectancy have to make transfers to cohorts that enjoy a longer life. It is important therefore to condition risk share on a trend path of rising longevity, e.g. by linking normal retirement to the longevity trend. If one focuses on deviations from the trend, one finds that annuitized pensions with defined benefits help share longevity risk across generations.

Uncertain health care expenses create similarly awkward insurance problems as longevity. Full insurance against medical innovations (say, though Medicare or Medicaid) would mean that cohorts receiving relatively inferior care would have to transfer resources to cohorts that benefit from medical innovations. Such transfers would be implied, for example, by the
fiscal balance rule of generational accounting. Efficient risk sharing does not support full coverage for retirees unexpected medical needs.

The paper models this issue from two perspectives. One view is that medical needs are inelastic and separable from other consumption. Then efficient risk sharing calls for the retiree generation’s unexpected medical needs to be funded in part by taxes on future generations and in part by reduced non-medical consumption. Alternatively, one may view medical care as a substitutable component of normal consumption and interpret increased expenditures as driven by declining quality-adjusted prices and more than unit-elastic demand. Then efficient risk sharing calls for the retiree generation to self-finance the impact of unexpected medical innovations, even for intergenerational transfers to decline a little. These results are, to reemphasize, macroeconomic and therefore disregard potentially challenging issues of cross-sectional distribution. They nonetheless provide a macroeconomic starting point for the design of health care policies.
References


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Table 1: Productivity and Asset Pricing Risks
(Responses to Unexpected Changes in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenarios:</th>
<th>Laissez-Faire</th>
<th>Laissez-Faire with Bequests</th>
<th>Efficient Solution</th>
<th>Calibrated Policy</th>
<th>More taxes and wage-indexing</th>
<th>All Safe Transfers</th>
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<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel 1A: Higher Productivity</strong> (35 percent)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital Investment</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel 1B: Higher Asset Values</strong> (40 percent)</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
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Notes: Columns refer to different policy scenarios, as follows.
Col.1: Basic overlapping generations economy without government and no bequests.
Col.2: Like Col.1 with accidental bequests.
Col.3: Responses with efficient risk sharing. (Key characteristic: Equal consumption responses.)
Col.4: Economy calibrated to United States data and fiscal institutions: partially wage-indexed social security, defined-benefits public health, safe public debt, capital income taxes with 15 percent marginal rate.
Col.5: All transfers wage-indexed, public debt wage- or GDP-indexed, capital income tax with 30 percent marginal rate, otherwise like Col.4.
Col.6: All transfers inflation-indexed, otherwise like Col.4.
Source: Own calculations.
Table 2: Demographic Risks: Fertility and Longevity
(Responses to Unexpected Changes in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenarios:</th>
<th>Laissez-Faire</th>
<th>Laissez-Faire with Bequests</th>
<th>Efficient Solution</th>
<th>Calibrated Policy</th>
<th>More taxes and wage-indexing</th>
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<td><strong>Panel 2A: Baby-Bust Decline in the Workforce (-15 percent)</strong></td>
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<td>-2.1</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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<td><strong>Panel 2B: Increased Longevity (+15 percent)</strong></td>
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<tr>
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Notes: Same scenarios are as in Table 1. Panel A considers a 15 decline in cohort size, roughly matching the U.S. baby-boom to baby-bust transition. Panel B assumes a 15 percent increase in the retirement period (about two years). Transfers are annuitized defined benefits in Col.4-5, and defined contributions in Col.6.
Source: Own calculations.
Table 3: Uncertain Medical Spending: Needs-driven or Innovation-driven?
(Responses to Unexpected Changes in Percent)

Scenarios: | Full Coverage for Retirees | Capped Benefits for Retirees | Efficient Risk Sharing |
---|---|---|---|
Panel 3A: Inelastic Increase in Medical Needs | (1) | (2) | (3) |
Consumption Spending in retirement | 6.6 | 0.0 | 1.8 |
Consumption Spending in working age | -1.6 | -1.4 | -1.4 |
Non-medical Cons. in retirement | 0.0 | -8.5 | -6.2 |
Non-medical Cons. in working age | -6.4 | -6.1 | -6.2 |
Disposable Income in working-age | -3.6 | 0.0 | -1.0 |
Capital Investment | -8.0 | 2.9 | 0.0 |
Medical Cost Coverage | 100 | 0 | 27 |
Panel 3B: Elastic Response to Medical Innovations | Consumption Spending in retirement | 6.6 | 0.0 | -0.7 |
Consumption Spending in working age | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
Non-medical Cons. in retirement | 0.0 | -6.6 | -7.4 |
Non-medical Cons. in working age | -3.9 | -3.4 | -3.4 |
Disposable Income in working-age | -3.6 | 0.0 | 0.4 |
Capital Investment | -11.5 | -1.2 | 0.0 |
Medical Cost Coverage | 100 | 0 | -11 |

Notes: Panel A assumes medical expenses are inelastic/needs-driven and increase 30 percent. Panel B assumes a 30 percent decline in quality-adjusted health care prices and an elastic response of medical consumption. Responses are computed for the calibrated model with stylized United States policy, as detailed in the text. Col.1: Retiree medical expenses are fully government-funded on the margin. Col.2: Retiree medical benefits are held constant. Col.3: Efficient risk sharing.
Source: own calculations.