

HUY NGUYEN

www.econhuy.com
huy@umail.ucsb.edu

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA

Placement Director: Emanuel Vespa vespa@ucsb.edu 805-893-7309
Graduate Administrator: Mark Patterson mark.patterson@ucsb.edu 805-893-2205

Office Contact Information

2127 North Hall
Department of Economics
Santa Barbara, CA, 93106-9210
Cell phone number: 760-224-7426

Personal Information
Age 30, Male, U.S. Citizen

Undergraduate Studies:

B.S., Management Science, University of California, San Diego, 2009
B.A., International Studies: Anthropology, University of California, San Diego, 2009
I.B. Diploma, Mathematics, Vista High School, 2005

Graduate Studies:

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2012 to present
Job Market Paper: "*A Theory of Pretense in Public Goods Provision*" (sole author 2017)
Dissertation Title: "*Essays in Information Economics*"
Expected Completion Date: June 2018

"United Nations Intensive Summer Program", Seton Hall University, Summer 2015
M.A., Economics, Boston University, 2011-2012

References:

Professor Ted Bergstrom UC Santa Barbara tedb@econ.ucsb.edu	Professor Gary Charness UC Santa Barbara charness@econ.ucsb.edu	Professor Peter Kuhn UC Santa Barbara pjkuhn@econ.ucsb.edu
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Fields: Microeconomics, Behavioral, Public, Development

Teaching Experience:

Instructor:

Summer 2017	"Intermediate Microeconomic Theory" (ECON 100B), U.C. Santa Barbara
Summer 2016	"Game Theory & Economics", Johns Hopkins CTY (at U.C. Santa Cruz)
Summer 2015	"Probability & Game Theory", Johns Hopkins CTY (at Loyola Marymount U.)
Summer 2014	"Fundamentals of Microeconomics", Johns Hopkins CTY (at Johns Hopkins U.)

Teaching Assistant:

Fall 2017	ECON 10A, UCSB, for Professor John Hartman & Olivier Deschenes
Spring 2017	ECON 2, UCSB, for Professor Javier Birchenall
Winter 2017	ECON 100B, UCSB, for Professor Zachary Grossman
Fall 2016	ECON 100B, UCSB, for Professor Charles Stuart
Spring 2015	ECON 140B, UCSB, for Professor Heather Royer
Winter 2015	ECON 1, UCSB, for Professor Kelly Bedard

Fall 2014	ECON 1, UCSB, for Professor Jon Sonstelie
Spring 2014	ECON 2, UCSB, for Professor Peter Rupert
Winter 2014	ECON 2, UCSB, for Professor Peter Rupert
Fall 2013	ECON 9, UCSB, for Professor Richard Watson
Spring 2013	ECON 2, UCSB, for Professor Javier Birchenall
Winter 2013	ECON 100B, UCSB, for Professor Emanuel Vespa
Fall 2012	PSY 5, UCSB, for Instructor Brian Lopez

Research Experience and Other Employment:

2009-2012	Founder & Director, Math Mentor San Diego (www.mathmentorsd.com)
Summer 2011	Research Assistant, Boston University, for Professor Hiroaki Kaido
2006-2007	Microfinance Intern, ACCION International
Summer 2006	Accounting Assistant, America Screens

Professional Activities:

Winter 2017	Tutoring Center Supervisor, UCSB, for Kelly Bedard
Fall 2014	Behavioral Lab Supervisor, UCSB, for Professor Zachary Grossman
Spring 2014	Referee for ILR Review
Spring 2014	Spring School in Behavioral Economics, UCSD Rady School

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2015-2016	Graduate Opportunity Fellowship (\$24,000 + tuition)
Summer 2015	Small Conference Grant (\$1000)
2013, 2014	GSA Excellence in Teaching Award Nominee
2011	RateMyTutor.com Honorable Mention
2005	San Diego Chess Champion

Research Papers:

"A Theory of Pretense in Public Goods Provision" (Job Market Paper, sole author 2017)

Abstract: A player decides to help, bystand, or pretend to help in providing a public good in two games: the volunteer's dilemma and the public goods game. Pretending does not contribute, but it costs less than helping and can confer prestige. If actual contribution is less than claimed contribution, some claimants may be doubted as fakes and shamed. When pretense is possible, both the individual's chance to help and the expected level of good provision are weakly less than when pretense is not possible. Whether pretense occurs does not depend on group size. Pretenders dilute the prestige from helping and discourage actual helpers. If pretense causes negative externalities, society would actually benefit from anonymizing contributors. Introducing authenticated help at a premium can eliminate pretense. Extensions on asymmetry and incomplete information reveal that equilibria can exist where help, bystand, and pretend are all played.

"Limiting Information Can Improve Cascades" (sole author 2015)

Abstract: N players in an information cascade receive independent signals on which of two restaurants is better. The signals are accurate with probability p , and the objective is to maximize the number of players who choose the better restaurant. I "blind" the first k players such that those players can observe their own private signal, but not the signal or choice of previous players. I prove that no blindness ($k = 0$) performs strictly better than full blindness ($k = n$), but that partial blindness ($0 < k < n$) performs best at some optimal $k^*(n,p)$. This suggests that reviews are best when some critics independently review first before allowing the general public to follow trends.

"Geometric Visualization of Revenue Equivalence" (sole author 2014)

Abstract: I provide geometric visualizations of revenue equivalence between first-price, second-price, and all-pay auctions for two players with uniformly-distributed private values using linear bidding strategies. I then revisit the same three auctions under discrete values and provide summation formulas as

approximations. I show that first-price generates more revenue than second-price, but less than all-pay for all finite bid increments. As these increments shrink toward zero, the expected revenues of all three converge to the continuous limit.

Research Paper(s) in Progress:

"An Experiment on Pretense in Public Goods Provision" (sole author)

"Entry Deterrence via Information Timing" (sole author)

"Optimal Composition in Generalized Stackelberg" (sole author)

Software: STATA, MATLAB, MS Office (Word, PowerPoint, Excel), MS Money, Peachtree, TEA, HTML, Adobe Creative Suite (Photoshop, Premiere, Flash), PaintShop Pro, 3D Studio MAX

Languages: English, Vietnamese, Spanish, Hindi