

HUY NGUYEN

www.econhuy.com

huy@umail.ucsb.edu

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA

Placement Director: Emanuel Vespa

vespa@ucsb.edu

805-893-7309

Graduate Administrator: Mark Patterson

mark.patterson@ucsb.edu

805-893-2205

Office Contact Information

2127 North Hall

Department of Economics

Santa Barbara, CA, 93106-9210

Cell phone number: 760-224-7426

Personal Information

Age 30, Male, U.S. Citizen

Undergraduate Studies:

B.S., Management Science, University of California, San Diego, 2009

B.A., International Studies: Anthropology, University of California, San Diego, 2009

Graduate Studies:

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2012 to present

Dissertation Title: "Essays in Information Economics"

Expected Completion Date: June 2018

"United Nations Intensive Summer Program", Seton Hall University, Summer 2015

M.A., Economics, Boston University, 2011-2012

References:

Professor Theodore Bergstrom

UC Santa Barbara

tedb@econ.ucsb.edu

Professor Gary Charness

UC Santa Barbara

charness@econ.ucsb.edu

Professor Peter Kuhn

UC Santa Barbara

pjkuhn@econ.ucsb.edu

Fields: Microeconomics, Behavioral, Public, Development

Teaching Experience:

Instructor:

Summer 2017 "Intermediate Microeconomic Theory" (ECON 100B), U.C. Santa Barbara

Summer 2016 "Game Theory & Economics", Johns Hopkins CTY (at U.C. Santa Cruz)

Summer 2015 "Probability & Game Theory", Johns Hopkins CTY (at Loyola Marymount U.)

Summer 2014 "Fundamentals of Microeconomics", Johns Hopkins CTY (at Johns Hopkins U.)

Teaching Assistant:

Fall 2017 ECON 10A, UCSB, for Professor John Hartman and Olivier Deschenes

Spring 2017 ECON 2, UCSB, for Professor Javier Birchenall

Winter 2017 ECON 100B, UCSB, for Professor Zachary Grossman

Fall 2016 ECON 100B, UCSB, for Professor Charles Stuart

Spring 2015 ECON 140B, UCSB, for Professor Heather Royer

Winter 2015 ECON 1, UCSB, for Professor Kelly Bedard

Fall 2014 ECON 1, UCSB, for Professor Jon Sonstelie

Spring 2014 ECON 2, UCSB, for Professor Peter Rupert

Winter 2014 ECON 2, UCSB, for Professor Peter Rupert

Fall 2013	ECON 9, UCSB, for Professor Richard Watson
Spring 2013	ECON 2, UCSB, for Professor Javier Birchenall
Winter 2013	ECON 100B, UCSB, for Professor Emanuel Vespa
Fall 2012	PSY 5, UCSB, for Instructor Brian Lopez

Research Experience and Other Employment:

Summer 2011	Boston University, Research Assistant for Professor Hiroaki Kaido
2009-2012	Math Mentor San Diego, Founder & Director

Professional Activities:

Winter 2017	Tutoring Center Supervisor, UCSB, for Kelly Bedard
Fall 2014	Behavioral Lab Supervisor, UCSB, for Professor Zachary Grossman
Spring 2014	Referee for ILR Review
Spring 2014	Spring School in Behavioral Economics, UCSD Rady School

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2015-2016	Graduate Opportunity Fellowship (\$24,000 + tuition)
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Research Papers:

"A Theory of Pretense in Public Goods Provision" (Job Market Paper, sole author 2017)

Abstract: A player decides to help, bystand, or pretend to help in providing a public good in two games: the volunteer's dilemma and the public goods game. Pretending does not contribute, but it costs less than helping and can confer prestige. If actual contribution is less than claimed contribution, some claimants may be doubted as fakes and shamed. When pretense is possible, both the individual's chance to help and the expected level of good provision are strictly less than when pretense is not possible. Whether pretense occurs does not depend on group size. Pretenders dilute the prestige from helping and discourage actual helpers. If pretense causes negative externalities, society would actually benefit from anonymizing contributors. Introducing authenticated help at a premium can eliminate pretense. Extensions on asymmetry and incomplete information reveal that equilibria can exist where help, bystand, and pretend are all played.

"Can Limiting Information Improve Cascades?" (sole author 2015)

Abstract: N players in an information cascade receive independent signals on which of two restaurants is better. The signals are accurate with probability p , and the objective is to maximize the number of players who choose the better restaurant. I "blind" the first k players such that those players can observe their own private signal, but not the signal or choice of previous players. I prove that no blindness ($k = 0$) performs strictly better than full blindness ($k = n$), but that partial blindness ($0 < k < n$) performs best at some optimal $k^*(n,p)$. This suggests that reviews are best when some critics independently review first before allowing the general public to follow trends.

"Geometric Visualization of Revenue Equivalence" (sole author 2014)

Abstract: I provide geometric visualizations of revenue equivalence between first-price, second-price, and all-pay auctions for two players with uniformly-distributed private values using linear bidding strategies. I then revisit the same three auctions under discrete values and provide summation formulas as approximations. I show that first-price generates more revenue than second-price, but less than all-pay for all finite bid increments. As these increments shrink toward zero, the expected revenues of all three converge to the continuous limit.

Research Paper(s) in Progress:

"An Experiment on Pretense in Public Goods Provision" (sole author)

"Entry Deterrence via Information Timing" (sole author)

"Optimal Composition in Generalized Stackelberg" (sole author)

Languages: English, Vietnamese, Spanish, Hindi